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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS 
THE POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM AND 
DEMOCRATIC CRISIS IN BOLIVIA 
by
Jennifer Marie Cyr 
Florida International University, 2005 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Eduardo A. Gamarra, Major Professor 
Using Kenneth Roberts’ (2002) party-society linkages framework, this study 
examined the reasons for the decline of the political party system in Bolivia after 2000, 
The political party system that emerged in 1985 was connected to society primarily 
through clientelist-based linkages. The economic and political model adopted after the 
transition to democracy severely debilitated the party system’s capacity to forge linkages 
with society beyond clientelism.
Using interviews, survey data, and primary and secondary documents, the study 
demonstrated that prolonged economic recession and social change revealed the 
weaknesses of the linkages connecting the political party system with Bolivian society. It 
concluded that the party system in Bolivia went into decline because it could not adapt to 
the country’s changing social landscape after 2000. The highly limited nature of 
clientelist-based linkages in Bolivia suggests that they were ill-suited to withstand 
economic recession and social crisis.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“El establecimiento de la democracia desde 1982 ha abierto un nuevo ciclo politico en el país” (Lazarte 
1991,588).
“El 17 de octubre del 2003 quiebra con la lógica de la política consecuencial... el centro hegemónico está 
vacio; hemos vuelto al debate de hace veinte años” (Mayorga, F. 2004).
In 1982, Dr. Hernán Siles Zuazo was elected President of Bolivia, officially 
marking the return to democracy in a country that had experienced almost twenty years of 
dictatorship, coups d’état, and intermittent and short-lived election cycles. Upon his call 
for new elections and his subsequent stepping down in 1985, a new era in Bolivian 
democracy would be forged -  one consisting of successive coalition governments, or a 
pacted democracy, and accompanied by a strict neoliberal economic plan, the New 
Economic Policy (NPE, in Spanish).
Six coalitions and twenty-one years later, Bolivia’s political system confronted 
the worst crisis of its recent democratic history. The then one year old administration, 
headed by Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, of the Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario 
(MNR), was forced to resign after months of protests, blockades, and calls for the 
dismantling of what many Bolivians would call his corrupt, exclusive, and ineffective 
coalition.1 Indeed, Sánchez de Lozada was not able to implement the majority of his 
economic and social policies in that first year. His negotiations with coca growers fell 
through, and plans to implement a 12.5% income tax hike and potentially sign a 
hydrocarbons deal were summarily rejected both by opposition in Congress and in the 
streets.
1 The Bolivian newspaper, La Razón, spells out in detail the events of October 2003, when Sánchez de 
Lozada was eventually forced to resign. See “21 Años,” : http://www.la- 
razon.com/Especial/Qctubre/esp03101 Oc.html (October 10, 2003).
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With the forced resignation of Sánchez de Lozada, Bolivia entered into a 
tumultuous period of political restructuring. The period was marked by the ascension of 
Sánchez de Lozada’s partyless vice president, Carlos Mesa Gilbert, to the presidency, the 
implementation of a law that expanded the right to ran for office to citizen and 
indigenous groups, and the use of referenda on important policy-making issues such as 
the exportation of the country’s large gas reserves and regional autonomy. These post- 
2003 “anti-party” characteristics of Bolivia’s political system, along with 2004 polling 
results suggesting that the popularity o f the country’s traditional political parties are at 
an all-time low, indicated that Bolivia’s political party system had been widely rejected 
and discredited by various sectors of society. The resulting party system decline forced 
the country to return, as Fernando Mayorga states above, to the political debates of 
twenty years past.
What can explain the dismantling of a political party system that had been both 
functioning and stable for almost twenty years? From where does a political crisis, such 
as the one experienced by Bolivia in the early twenty-first century, arise? The following 
pages seek to analyze the emergence and decline of the traditional political party system 
in Bolivia, identifying the primary reasons for and the subsequent legacies of the political 
crisis of 2003-2004.
The contents of this paper have important implications for issues of political 
representation in general. The question is asked: why do political party systems fail to be 
representative? Literature abounds (including O’Donnell 1996 and 1998, Huntington
2 During the era of pacted democracy, coalition governments had been alternately run by three political 
parties: the MNR, the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR), and the Acción Democrática 
Nacionalista (ADN). Henceforth, any use o f the term “traditional political parties” or the “traditional 
political party system” in Bolivia will refer to these three parties.
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1991) on the difficulties faced by newly democratizing countries to make their nascent 
regimes work efficiently and effectively. This literature suggests that democratization 
has been superficial at best and a practical failure at worst. The analysis below works 
from the assumption that challenges to effective mediation between the state and society 
have impeded the process of democratization in countries like Bolivia. Assessing those 
challenges in the Bolivian case may shed some light on what might make political party 
systems, and hence representative democracy, work for many countries in the years 
ahead.
Using Kenneth Roberts’ (2002) party-society linkages framework, this study 
examines the reasons for the decline of the traditional political party system in Bolivia 
before, during, and after the political crisis of 2003. The following pages demonstrate 
that the weakly institutionalized political party system (Mainwaring and Scully 1995) that 
emerged after the transition to democracy in 1982 was sustained by clientelist-based 
patrimonial party-society linkages with primarily the urban middle class. The economic 
and political models adopted after the transition severely debilitated the party system’s 
capacity to expand these linkages. Different sectors of Bolivian society, including the 
newly politicized urban poor and rural classes, thus began to look elsewhere for 
alternative forms of representation that could accommodate their growing demands, 
including with political parties founded in the 1990s and the newly formalized citizen and 
indigenous groups in 2004.
The failure of the traditional political party system to maintain its linkages, as 
well as its inability to forge new linkages with Bolivian society, would be detrimental to 
its long-term sustainability. These failures, together with a prolonged economic crisis
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and a longstanding tradition of corporatist-based mobilization in the country, exacerbated 
tensions between the traditional political parties and the newly empowered political 
forces both in Congress and in the streets. The findings of this study suggest that the 
traditional political party system in Bolivia was dependent upon middle class-based, 
clientelist party-society linkages for survival. Unable to accommodate the demands of 
the newly politicized urban and rural poor, the legitimacy and sustainability of the 
traditional political party system were severely undermined.
Reviewing the Literature
Political parties are essential for present-day Latin American democracies. This 
widely shared and longstanding belief (Schattschneider 1942, Mainwaring and Scully 
1995, Mainwaring 1999, Lipset 2000, Levitsky and Cameron 2003) has helped orient 
democratic theory and scholarship in the region despite the challenges political party 
systems in most of Latin America have consistently confronted since the third wave of 
democratization (Huntington 1991) began in the 1970s.
The importance o f political parties for representative democracy derives from 
their role as mediators between state and society. Sartori (1976) asserts that political 
parties are the institutional instrument of representation within the political system. They 
are independent agents that channel the demands of their constituents to government. 
That is, parties should be instruments for “representing the people by expressing their 
demands” (Sartori 1976, 27, emphasis in the original). Sartori underscores this 
expressive function of political parties. He contends that parties should use their power 
to wield influence in government. They should, in effect, be a “mechanism of retaliation 
and enforcement” o f the “citizens’ ‘voices’” (Sartori 1976, 58).
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Despite their implicit importance for representative democracy, political party 
systems in Latin America have been studied extensively by relatively few scholars. The 
literature that has been published is both thorough and illuminating with regards to 
several different characteristics of party systems in Latin America. Typically, academics 
use three theoretical approaches to study political party systems in the region. They 
develop classification schemes for understanding parties cross-nationally; study the 
institutional factors that might either weaken or strengthen party systems; and analyze the 
structural factors that bring about the emergence of parties and party systems and thus 
offer insight into why those systems might decline. While this last perspective provides 
the theoretical basis of the work at hand, each approach to Latin American party systems 
is fundamental for understanding the complex and dynamic lifeblood that has made 
representative democracies “workable” in the region (Levitsky and Cameron 2003, 3),
The works of Sartori (1976), Downs (1957), Coppedge (1997), and Alcántara and 
Friedenberg (2001) utilize the first theoretical approach for examining political party 
systems. Specifically, they devise several different formulas for evaluating party system 
formation and identifying the parties that make up each system. Sartori’s denotes two 
dimensions for classifying party systems. He uses the number of parties in a system and 
the ideological difference among parties to categorize party systems into seven different 
classes (Sartori 1976, 125). Downs approaches systems from the spatial dimension and 
argues that systems tend to fall along a continuum in which parties fulfill the ideological 
demands of a society as determined by voters’ preferences.
Works such as these have provided the theoretical foundations for later 
assessments of party systems. In the case of Sartori and Downs, however, their texts
5
have been used primarily to understand the party systems of advanced industrial countries 
(Mainwaring 1999, 23). Thus, their applicability to the characteristics of political parties 
in newly democratizing countries such as those found in Latin America is limited. 
Michael Coppedge (1997) produced a working paper with the particular purpose of 
classifying the major political parties from eleven different countries in Latin America.
He collaborated with a series of specialists to characterize each country’s parties along 
the left/right axis, the secular/Christian divide, or as being personalist, environmental, 
regional, ethnic, or feminist (Coppedge 1997, 2). Similarly, Alcántara and Friedenberg 
identify two internal and three external characteristics of the political parties in eighteen 
different Latin American countries, in an effort to view a party not just as one part of a 
system’s “pluralistic whole” (Sartori 1976, 26) but also as an entity in itself with its own 
unique interests. The goal of all four of these classification systems is to allow for cross­
national comparisons of political parties and party systems. Yet, in each case 
characterization is inevitably static, denying each party system any dynamism -  a trait 
that is particularly important to consider in the context of democratization.
Linz (1994), Mainwaring and Scully (1995), and Mainwaring (1999) argue that 
institutional factors best explain the nuances of a country’s party system. They utilize the 
second theoretical approach for understanding Latin American political party systems. 
For Linz, the great debate centers on the merits of parliamentary versus presidential or 
semi-presidential systems. Presidentialism within the context of a weak multiparty 
system, he argues, feeds upon and exacerbates the weaknesses of parties by forcing the 
executive to bypass partisan entities in order to enact policy through individualist and 
often clientelistic means (Linz 1994, 35). Linz’s bias towards parliamentarism may help
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in illuminating the weaknesses of presidential systems and, in the case of Bolivia, of 
hybrid presidential systems (Gamarra 1997). Having identified the debilities of these 
systems, however, Linz’s work cannot explain why a weakly institutionalized hybrid 
presidential system like Bolivia’s would last as long as it did; consequently, it cannot 
help explain which variables would eventually lead to that system’s decline.
Mainwaring and Scully (1995) use the institutional approach to differentiate party 
systems along an inchoate-institutionalized continuum, identifying four measures for 
evaluating to what extent a political party system is institutionalized. They argue, as does 
Mainwaring (1999), that greater institutionalization fosters a more stable and enduring 
democracy in a country. The consequences of a weakly institutionalized system, on the 
other hand, can profoundly affect a country’s “democratic survival,” since these systems 
are equated with a higher degree of personalism and uncertainty and weaker mechanisms 
of accountability (Mainwaring 1999, 38). Following Mainwaring and Scully (1995), 
Mainwaring’s 1999 work hints at some of the possible implications o f a weakly 
institutionalized system, not just for governance and representation, but for the survival 
of the regime in general. Ultimately, however, their classification scheme for party 
systems, as with Coppedge (1998) and Alcántara and Friedenberg (2001), is inherently 
limited in terms of understanding the dynamic nature of the post-transition party systems 
in countries like Bolivia. Thus, it is not able to expound upon the factors that bring about 
either the strengthening or, as in the case of interest here, the decline of political party 
systems.
The third theoretical approach to party systems is a structural one, and it comes 
closest to understanding the underlying forces that cause the emergence, and hence also
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the potential decline or decay, of a political party system. Specifically, structuralists 
identify the existing social, economic, and political conditions that shape the nature and 
characteristics of an emerging party system. They provide an historical context for 
understanding why a party system is the way it is and in this way help illuminate the 
cracks and “fault lines” (Agüero and Stark 1998) in the system that could also bring 
about its decline.
For example, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) offer a look at the emergence of party 
systems in Western Europe. They argue that party systems arise out of alternative 
alliances and oppositions during the period of nation-building. The process of nation- 
building, they argue, is shaped by a two-dimensional space in which the political 
expressions of territorial-cultural and functional conflicts -  also called cleavages -  fall. 
How these conflicts emerge and how they are subsequently addressed will determine in 
large part the nature and alignment of political parties within a country (Lipset and 
Rokkan 1967, 5-7).
Collier and Collier’s (1991) study on labor relations is another example. They 
look at the different policies adopted by eight Latin American countries in response to 
their growing labor movements. They argue that the decision to implement different 
labor policies led to the formation of different institutions that shaped the character of 
labor-state relations for years to come. The distinct institutional design chosen in each 
case sparked a process of political evolution that would ultimately determine the nature 
of each governmental regime and how it subsequently interacted with society (Collier and 
Collier 1991, 37). The analyses of Lipset and Rokkan and of Collier and Collier offer 
important insight on the emergence of party systems in specific countries at specific
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times. That said, their approach is inherently limited to past historical periods: for Lipset 
and Rokkan, the era of the reformation and the French and Industrial Revolutions, and for 
Collier and Collier, the “initial incorporation” of the labor movement in their country set 
(Collier and Collier 1991, 22). As such, they cannot serve as a framework for addressing 
the emergence of party systems in general, including, for the purposes of this study, the 
Bolivian political party system that was established in the 1980s.
Coppedge (1998) argues that party systems in Latin America are either 
“established” or “chaotic” depending upon the nature of the political order prior to the 
expansion of political participation to the lower and middle classes and the time-frame in 
which such participation was granted (Coppedge 1998, 199). The impact of these two 
conditions influences party system development in terms of the cleavages that divide the 
parties, the legitimacy of the opposition, and the degree to which the parties are 
institutionalized. His work helps us to understand why certain party systems emerge in 
different Latin American countries, but it is less helpful in understanding the subsequent 
life cycle of each system, as well as its possible decline.
Kenneth Roberts5 work (2002) on Latin American political party systems 
overcomes the geographical and historical limitations of the aforementioned studies, 
putting forth a framework that allows us to understand party system decline at any point 
during a party system’s life cycle. Thus, his work applies to the Bolivian traditional 
political party system of the late 20th century. The scholar analyzes extant political party 
systems and the particular ways in which those systems interact with society. Viewing 
political parties as “vital intermediaries” between state and society (Roberts 2002, 13), he 
argues that there are five different party-society linkages that connect political parties to
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their constituents. Political brokerage and patron-client linkages are based on the 
exchange of material benefits for political support. Encapsulating linkages, also known 
as corporatist or participatory linkages, forge powerful bonds between politicians and 
their constituents, who are generally organized into social blocs. Ideological and 
programmatic commitments form the basis of programmatic linkages, whereas 
personalistic linkages are characterized by the charismatic bond that forms between a 
party leader and voters. Finally, marketing linkages are based upon contingent and 
temporary connections that are formed primarily at electoral junctures and then quickly 
dissolve.
Importantly, these party-society linkages evolve. They are established when 
political parties can ally themselves with the social and economic cleavages in a given 
society at a given time. They decline or decay3 when the political party system does not 
adapt as the social and economic cleavages shift. Thus, Roberts develops a causal 
relationship between social and economic change and the effectiveness of a political 
party system. A political party system can avoid crises if  it is able to adapt to and evolve 
with the changing nature of society. This proposition holds true at any point during a 
party system’s life cycle, giving the approach dynamism and long-term applicability. 
That is, it allows us to evaluate the status of a party system’s linkages with society at any
3 Roberts is not explicit about the meanings o f party system decline and party system decay in his work 
(Roberts 2002, 2003) on party-society linkages. However, it is clear from the context in which he employs 
both terms that party system decline is used when a party system is dealigning from the linkages that 
formerly connected that system with society. Party system decay happens when the political parties have 
completely dealigned with society and, in the absence of the formation o f new party-society linkages, have 
been unable to realign with that society and are dismantled completely. Venezuala’s party system is an 
example o f party system decay, since the emergence o f Hugo Chávez, as a populist non-party system 
leader, replaced the former system entirely. Party system decline, however, suggests that the process of 
dealignment of the political party system is still incomplete. Thus, party system realignment or total decay 
are both still very real possibilities.
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given period and, unlike Coppedge’s theory above, is not limited to understanding only 
party system emergence.
Roberts (2002) is not alone in his theory about linkages. Conaghan (1996) 
specifically addresses the Andean region -  Bolivia included -  when she asserts that the 
problematic nature of democracy in the Andes is due to “faulty political linkages” 
(Conaghan 1996, 34). Moreover, Roberts (2003) further elaborates this idea of failing 
linkages in his analysis of the decline and eventual decay of the Venezuelan political 
party system in the 1990s. He contends that prolonged economic crisis and social change 
in Venezuela led to the erosion of the encapsulating and clientelist linkages that had been 
the primary mediating channels between state and society throughout the period of import 
substitution industrialization (ÍSI). In particular, the shift from a state-oriented economic 
policy to one based on neoliberal principles undermined corporatist relationships and thus 
aggravated the clientelist demands upon the much-reduced state. Unable to 
accommodate these demands, the strong linkages between state and society eroded, 
eventually causing the party system’s demise. The erosion of these linkages enabled the 
emergence of the unmediated (that is, essentially partyless) populist leadership o f Hugo 
Chávez Frias.
Thus, the idea of linkages is important for understanding the state of alignment, 
dealignment, in the case where parties detach from their social moorings, or subsequent 
realignment of political parties vis-a-vis society. When these linkages have eroded, the 
mediating capacity of political parties is debilitated or severed, undermining the 
popularity and credibility of these representative institutions and making the creation of 
new linkages between parties and society increasingly difficult. Thus, the sustainability
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or decline of a party system is dependent upon its ability to maintain societal linkages 
within a changing economic, political, and/or social context.
In the case o f Venezuela, Roberts argues that the political party system failed to 
preserve its corporatist and clientelist linkages with Venezuelan society. The subsequent 
party system decline led to a surge in populism, dismantling the formerly institutionalized 
two-party system altogether. The analysis to follow will employ Roberts’ theory of 
party-society linkages to evaluate the state of Bolivia’s traditional political parties in the 
early 21st century, more then fifteen years after its party system was consolidated within 
the country’s newly established democratic regime. The emergence and subsequent crisis 
o f Bolivia’s political party system serves as an opportunity for building an understanding 
of what conditions might lead to party system decline. This is important because, as 
Roberts acknowledges, literature on party decline and decay is scarce (Roberts 2003, 40). 
The Bolivian Traditional Political Party system as a Case Study
Bolivia serves as an interesting case for testing Roberts’ argument that prolonged 
social and economic change can lead to the erosion of party-society linkages and thus 
party system decline. The country is unique from Roberts’ Venezuelan case study 
because, up until the transition to democracy in 1982, the corporatist and clientelist 
linkages between political parties and society were extremely tenuous in the country. 
Thus, the traditional political party system that was established in 1985 initially had very 
weak linkages with the Bolivian populace. Instead of strengthening these linkages, 
however, the political and economic model adopted at that time exacerbated their 
inherent weaknesses.
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In particular, the austerity measures embodied in the NPE reduced the size of the 
state and privatized the industries that provided the material and organizational resources 
needed to maintain corporatist linkages. The principle of pacted democracy diminished 
the role of the traditional political party system, preventing those parties from 
establishing new linkages with society beyond clientelist-based patrimonialism. When 
the country faced prolonged economic recession and social change after 2000, the party 
system was unable to maintain its clientelist linkages with society. Moreover, the 
longstanding political influence of other non-state actors, as well as the emergence of 
new political parties and social movements, served as attractive alternatives to traditional 
political party-based representation. After 2000, the convergence of these factors forced 
the political party system into decline.
The study to follow makes this argument by looking first at the state-society 
linkages that existed prior to the consolidation of the traditional political party system. 
After the National Revolution in 1952, the MNR’s attempt to establish an enduring 
hegemonic single-party system failed. This was due in part to the party’s inability to co­
opt important sectors of Bolivian society within its party network. Its failure can also be 
attributed, however, to the unusual strength of the country’s Workers Central (in Spanish, 
the Central Obrera Boliviana [COB]), the nationally-based confederation of labor unions 
that stridently maintained its autonomy from the MNR’s grasp upon its creation in the 
aftermath of the 1952 Revolution.
When a coup d’état placed the military in charge after twelve years of 
increasingly debilitated MNR leadership, the influence of political parties in the Bolivian 
state disappeared almost entirely. Between 1964 and 1978, the straggle for control of the
13
country took place primarily between two other potent actors: the COB and the military. 
While the 1970s brought about the foundation of the other two political parties that would 
eventually form the “tripod” (Mayorga, R., 2002) of the country’s traditional political 
party system,4 politics during this time was marked by either close alliances or sharp 
conflicts between the military and the unions (Lazarte 1991, 584). Thus, prior to the 
transition to representative democracy in 1982, the role of political parties as 
intermediaries between state and society was matched and at times undermined by both 
the COB and the military.
When the country restored the democratically elected president, Hernán Siles 
Zuazo, and his leftist coalition, Unidad Democrática y  Popular (UDP), to power in 1982, 
the principle of party-led government would be reinitiated for the first time in thirty 
years. As a part of his broad-based coalition, Siles Zuazo initially incorporated the COB 
and the rural sectors into government, using the post-Revolution corporatist logic of co- 
government to coopt and integrate these influential constituencies into the state. Faced 
with one of the worst economic crises in the country’s history, an opposition-led 
Congress, and the eventual failure o f co-government with labor and the campesinos, 
however, Siles Zuazo was unable to maintain control of the country and was forced to 
call for early elections in 1985.
Many scholars (Lazarte 1991, Klein 1992, Mayorga, R. 1997, Calderón and 
Gamarra 2003, Mayorga, F. 2004, Gamarra 2003b) have recognized the importance of 
the first year o f the administration of Víctor Paz Estenssoro (MNR, 1985-1989) in the 
forging o f a new political and economic stabilization program for the country.
4 The MIR was founded in 1971, the ADN in 1979.
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Specifically, Paz Estenssoro and his team of technocrats established a precedent for 
congressionally supported coalition rule -  called democracia pactada, or pacted 
democracy -  while simultaneously implementing a “draconian austerity program,” 
known as the NPE, designed to put an end to the long-standing and severe economic 
crisis in the country (Gamarra 2003b, 298), In essence, in 1985, a distinct form of 
representative rule was established alongside a distinct model for economic reform.
Taken together, the 1985 reforms fashioned an unprecedented system for 
centralized economic and political decision-making unlike anything Bolivians had 
experienced in the past -  what one scholar (Mayorga, F. 2004) has called a “hegemonic 
center”. Importantly, this center consisted of the dominance of the three traditional 
political parties that would alternate governance of the country in the form of coalitions 
from 1985 until the elections of 2002. It would be buoyed on both sides by the principle 
of pacted democracy and the NPE. The hegemonic center would be so strong that, as 
Fernando Mayorga suggests, it would forge coalitions out of political parties with an at 
times mutual dislike for each other5 and establish agreements from these coalitions to 
form public policies despite an at times strong opposition in the legislative branch 
(Mayorga, F. 2004).
The analysis to follow demonstrates that the strength of this hegemonic center of 
traditional political parties was fundamental in establishing the political stability 
necessary in order to make decision-making and the implementation of reforms possible. 
At the same time, this analysis suggests that the nature of Bolivia’s hegemonic center
5 For example, the Acuerdo Patriótico (1989-93) between the leftist MIR and the conservative right-wing 
ADN and the most recent coalition between the MNR and the MIR (2002-2003).
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weakened the traditional political party system’s linkages with society. The NPE 
destroyed any farther capacity for the encapsulating, corporatist-based linkages that had 
traditionally linked Bolivian society to the state by drastically reducing the size of the 
country’s bureaucracy and privatizing most of the state-run industries that had served as 
the material foundations of the unions and as the source of patronage for the political 
parties. Moreover, conditions of scarcity and poor economic growth limited farther the 
reach of this patronage-based clientelism, thus reducing the impact of the traditional party 
system’s primary linkage with society after 1985.
Despite the nature of the party-society linkages in Bolivia after the transition to 
democracy, the traditional political party system remained in power and was even stable 
until the end of the 1990s. All of this changed at the turn of the millennium. Faced with 
an acute two-year economic crisis, the resource-stricken government was trapped 
between addressing intense international pressures to curb the cultivation of coca and 
equally intense but contradictory internal demands from an increasingly politicized civil 
society. Here, the limitations of the clientelist-based linkages between the traditional 
political parties and society became evident. Oriented historically towards Bolivia’s 
urban middle class, these linkages could not sufficiently enfranchise the newly mobilized 
urban and rural sectors in the country. Thus, the sectors began to look beyond the 
traditional political parties for economic and social relief, turning their votes and thus 
their tacit support to the newly formed political parties that emerged in the 1990s and 
early 21st century.
This study suggests that since 2000, the decline of Bolivia’s traditional political 
party system became increasingly apparent. Indeed, by 2005, it appeared that the weak
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linkages that connected the traditional political parties to Bolivian society had been all 
but severed. For one, the vice president-tumed-president Carlos Mesa had no formal 
political party support and based his popular October Agenda6 on this fact. Furthermore, 
important policy decisions were removed from the realm of the legislature and left to the 
consideration of the Bolivian population at large. The referendum on the Hydrocarbons 
Law in July 2004 was an important example of this. A third important aspect of the post-
2003 political system was the institutionalization of a Law of Citizen and Indigenous 
Groups {Ley de Agrupaciones Ciudadanas y  Pueblos Indígenas), This law allowed 
political candidates to run independently of political parties as a part of newly legislated 
citizen or indigenous groups.
Each of these institutional changes represented a move further away from the use 
o f political parties as the sole channel of representation in the country’s democratic 
regime. They also reflected the degree to which linkages between these parties and 
society had eroded. As we will see in the chapters that follow, in the case of Bolivia, the 
decline of the traditional political party system had its roots, somewhat ironically, in the 
very economic and political reforms that made the party system possible in the first place. 
By 2005, the outcomes of this decline, that is, whether it would detach from society 
altogether or realign with society along new party-society linkages were still unclear.
Following Roberts’ party-society framework, then, the hypothesis tested in the 
proceeding pages is the following;
6 Mesa took over the presidency with the promise to: organize a binding referendum on the extraction and 
processing o f the country’s hydrocarbons; pass a new Hydrocarbons Law in accordance with that 
referendum; and realize a Constituent Assembly {La Razón, 18 October 2003). These three promises came 
to be known as his October Agenda.
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Question # 1: Why did Bolivia’s traditional political party system enter into
decline after 2000?
Hypothesis #1: Bolivia’s traditional political party system entered into decline,
because the weak clientelist linkages it had forged with Bolivian 
society were unable to adapt to shifting societal demands in the 
country after 2000.
Methodology and Analysis
Using Robert’s theory of party-society linkages in the case of Bolivia requires
identifying the linkages that existed between political parties and society prior to the
country’s transition to democracy in the 1980s. Thus, Chapter Two is dedicated to
developing the political history of Bolivia from before the 1952 National Revolution until
the transition to democracy in the early 1980s. It concludes that political parties were not
the sole intermediary between state and society in the country’s political system during
this time. Other political actors, including the military and the COB, served as equally
powerful vehicles for representation in the country, and their linkages were based on
clientelism and corporatism.
It is also necessary to analyze the emergence and evolution of the traditional
political party system that would eventually enter into decline in the early 21st century.
Chapter Three looks at the formulation and maturation of this party system throughout
the 1980s and 1990s, examining the clientelist linkages forged with Bolivian society. It
analyzes the role of pacted democracy and the NPE in hindering the capacity of the
traditional political parties to sustain their linkages with society as well as forge new
linkages. It also addresses the growing economic recession and accompanying social
changes by the end of the 1990s. Constrained by the political and economic models
adopted in 1985, the traditional political parties were unable to accommodate the growing
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demands brought about by the economic crisis by the end of the century. In essence, 
while pacted democracy and the NPE brought both governance and stability to the 
country, they also enabled the decline of the traditional political party system.
Chapter Four examines the various manifestations of the erosion of party-society 
linkages in Bolivia. The analysis in this chapter is achieved through a triangulation of 
methods. Cross-national data from two different sets of surveys help gauge the opinions 
of Bolivian society during the period of traditional party system rale and during its 
decline. Professor Mitchell A. Seligson, with the support of the University of Pittsburgh 
and USAID, carried out nationwide surveys on the political culture of Bolivian 
democracy every two years since 1998. These data allow for a limited comparison of the 
changing views of a representative sample of Bolivians over a time period that began 
during the period of party system rule and continued through 2004. The Bolivian 
National Electoral Court (CNE, in Spanish) carried out, with the support of the Canadian 
Agency for International Development, the Second National Study on Democracy and 
Democratic Values in Bolivia during the second half of 2004. This nationwide effort 
used surveys, in-depth interviews, and focus groups to evaluate Bolivian perceptions 
toward and expectations of democracy. Analysis of these data supports this study’s 
contention that the traditional political parties in Bolivia became detached from their 
social moorings after 2000.
Additionally, interviews and seminars carried out during two trips to Bolivia in
2004 and 2005 emphasize the challenges faced by the party system after the transition to 
democracy in the 1980s and up until its eventual decline. Primary documents, including 
constitutional amendments and enacted legislation from the 1980s to 2003, provide the
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historical context needed to support the evidence from the interviews and the 
interpretation of the aforementioned surveys and focus groups. Finally, secondary 
documents, including newspapers and other academic literature, serve to deepen the 
analysis and understanding of the events that took place throughout the period of 
Bolivian political history examined here. Altogether, the evidence demonstrates that the 
linkages connecting the traditional political party system with Bolivian society were 
unable to endure the economic and social changes after 2000.
One possible limitation of the paper is its external validity. While general trends 
in party-society linkages can and have been identified cross-nationally over time (Roberts 
2002, 2003), the nature and evolution of the party-society linkages in the Bolivian case 
are inevitably case-specific. However, the impact of economic reforms on other weakly 
institutionalized political party systems, such as, for example, Ecuador or Peru, may 
prove to be similar to the Bolivian case. Thus, the evolution and decline of the party 
system in Bolivia can serve as a basis of comparison for understanding the emergence 
and decline of other political party systems in the region. This analysis makes the case, 
then, for future comparative work with other decayed or declining party systems in Latin 
America or beyond.
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II. HISTORICAL TRENDS IN BOLIVIAN POLITICS
Understanding why certain linkages between political parties and society do or do
not exist today is only possible by evaluating the historical context out of which those
linkages arose. The three traditional political parties in Bolivia’s party system, the MNR,
the MIR, and the ADN, emerged prior to the return to democracy in 1982. They each
were founded for different reasons and during unique periods of the country’s political
history. The goal of this chapter is to examine those periods prior to Bolivia’s transition
to democracy and highlight the important characteristics of its political system during that
time. The linkages between state and society forged then had a profound impact on the
weak mediating capacities of the post-transition political party system.
As mentioned in Chapter One, Kenneth Roberts (2002) identifies five different
types of linkages that have historically connected society to political parties in Latin
thAmerica. He contends that, throughout the 20 century and particularly during the 
periods o f economic growth based on import substitution industrialization (ISI), the 
bonds that existed in the region were primarily of a corporatist and clientelist nature 
(Roberts 2003, 44). Bolivia fits this generalization. Where they were present, the 
linkages between the country’s political parties and society between the 1950s and 1980s 
tended to be either clientelist or corporatist in character.
Chapter Two, then, develops the history of state-society linkages throughout 
Bolivian contemporary history. It is organized into four sections that address each of the 
important pre-democratic transition periods in recent Bolivian history. As the pages to 
follow demonstrate, the role of intermediary between state and society varied during each 
period. Prior to the 1952 National Revolution, the Bolivian political system consisted of
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two parties that alternated power within a severely limited democratic regime. The 
linkages that existed reflected the Liberal and Conservative cleavages typical in Latin 
America at that time (Coppedge 1998). After 1952, a single hegemonic party, the MNR, 
dominated the country, forging linkages to society that were corporatist and clientelist- 
based. A succession of military regimes controlled the country after 1964; here, too 
linkages were primarily clientelist and corporatist in nature. The period of the tortuous 
transition to democracy beginning after 1978 marked a time when the state-society 
linkages were few but political actors who wanted power were many.
The chapter concludes that, while the traditional political parties emerged before 
the transition to democracy, their role as an intermediary between state and society was 
matched by that o f both the military and the COB in terms of governance and 
representation. Thus, the linkages they forged with society were at best very tenuous. It 
is important to examine each of these periods, and the traditional political parties’ role in 
Bolivia’s political system during this time, because both were influential in determining 
the party-society linkages that emerged after 1985.
Clientelism and Corporatism
Before entering into the historical analysis, it is necessary to first clarify the 
study’s usage of corporatism and clientelism. As some authors acknowledge (Collier and 
Collier 1979), concepts like these tend to be used broadly to describe a range of different 
political behaviors. To avoid such confusion, each term is first defined here. Further 
reference to both clientelism and corporatism should be interpreted with each definition 
in mind. Corporatist bonds are constructed as vertically segmented relationships between 
a bureaucratic center (i.e. the state) and a network of legally recognized guilds and/or
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corporations (for example, organized labor, campesino organizations, and the private 
sector). These organized sectors of society encapsulate individual interests collectively; 
in turn, the state addresses the demands and interests of the sectors (Kaufman 1977, 111).
The logic o f representation behind corporatism contrasts with that which underlies 
a modern-day polyarchy (Dahl 1971, 1998) or representative democracy. Whereas 
representative democracies utilize political parties as the primary channels of mediation 
between state and society, in a corporatist system, these channels are practically 
eliminated in exchange for direct interaction between the state and sectorally-segmented 
society. As the Bolivian case demonstrates, the role of historically strong labor unions in 
the country has perpetuated conflicts between the state and society since the 1952 
National Revolution. The struggle to determine who has the monopoly of representation 
within the Bolivian political system is one that has been ongoing since that time.
Clientelism consists o f a particularistic exchange relationship between two actors 
of unequal power or status (Kaufman 1977, 113). Here, too, a vertical relationship exists 
between state and society. In this instance, however, the link between these actors is one 
based on the reciprocal exchange of goods and services. Clientelist-based linkages are 
inherently contingent upon these exchanges. Where resources are scarce, the fleeting and 
temporary character of the relationship is exacerbated. At the same time, resource 
scarcity foments clientelist behaviors. The capacity to mount social assistance or service 
provision programs are weakened and thus appeals for votes occur on a more individual 
level. As a result, incentives to collectively organize around programmatic appeals are 
virtually non-existent (Valenzuela 1977, 167). The paradox between scarcity and 
clientelism underscores the tenuous nature of linkages based on this type of behavior.
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Clientelism thrives in an environment of scarcity but at the same time is severely limited 
in scope because of that scarcity and, accordingly, is vulnerable to change.
In the Bolivian case, clientelistic dynamics dominated the political system after 
the transition to democracy. Specifically, the state functioned almost exclusively through 
neopatrimonialism, or the logic of appropriating public office for private means. 
Dependent upon support networks to maintain rale, Bolivian leaders have continually 
drawn from state coffers in order to sustain and expand that support. As a result, the state 
becomes little more than a “personal resource to maintain [the neopatrimonial leader’s] 
rule” (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 110). The weaknesses of these clientelist-based 
neopatrimonial linkages between the traditional political party system and society became 
apparent by the end of the 1990s, as subsequent chapters demonstrate. Like corporatism, 
however, these linkages connected the society to the state throughout the 20th century -  
well before the traditional political party system was established in 1985.
The analysis that follows looks at the evolution of the clientelist and corporatist- 
based linkages between state and society during Bolivia’s contemporary political history. 
By understanding how these linkages materialized prior to the adoption of representative 
democracy, it is possible to evaluate their impact on the role of the traditional political 
party system after 1985. Specifically, the role of the military and the COB was on par 
with and at times more influential than that of the traditional political parties prior to the 
democratic transition. Thus, the parties had to compete with each of these actors as 
intermediaries between the Bolivian state and the population. As a result, the traditional 
political party system maintained tenuous linkages with society heading into the period of 
representative democracy.
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The Pre-Revolutionary Period: Bolivia prior to 1952
Prior to the 1952 National Revolution, Bolivia’s political system was largely 
restricted to and controlled by a small set of political elites who were unified by similar 
economic interests. In particular, between 1884 and 1899, leadership of the country 
alternated between the Conservative and Liberal parties, and no more than ten percent of 
the adult male population was able to vote (Gamarra and Malloy 1995, 400), At this 
time, too, the economic importance of Bolivia’s tin industry was growing to its height, 
and most of the political activity was focused on the powerful tin barons, also known as 
la rosea, or three tin-exporting families who controlled most of the country’s economic 
and thus political resources.
With the arrival of the twentieth century, the influence of the Conservative Party 
had largely dwindled, since most of its base consisted of the then declining silver 
oligarchy. Caudillo-based Liberal factions took over the struggle for power, and 
government became little more than “a commodity, a prize in the struggle between 
factions made up of the leaders drawn from the elite” (Gamarra and Malloy 1995, 401). 
Politics at the time, then, was for a very select group of elites. The peasant groups, poor 
urban class sectors, and the growing middle class were largely excluded from 
participating in the limited two-party democracy.
All of this changed with Bolivia’s defeat in the Chaco War (1932-1935). Called a 
“humiliating military disaster,” the results of this war helped bring about the demise of 
the early twentieth century political elites (Malloy 1970, 322). At the time, the effects of 
the 1929 worldwide depression were being felt and Bolivia’s tin industry was 
experiencing an unprecedented decline. This decline restricted the political elite’s ability
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to control the new labor groups that had emerged during the peak years of tin extraction 
and exportation. In the 1930s, then, the convergence of economic crisis, tin industry 
decline, and Bolivia’s tragic military loss served as important factors in rendering the 
Liberal party politicians, and la rosea in general, ineffective in controlling Bolivia’s 
increasingly mobilized and underrepresented society.
In the Liberal Party’s wake, new parties emerged that corresponded with the 
demands of the newly politicized sectors of Bolivian society. On the left, the Partido de 
la Izquierda Revolucionaria (PIR, 1940) was founded, as well as the trotskyist Partido 
Obrero Revolucionario (POR, 1944), which became the primary party for the labor 
groups. The leftover oligarchy and other Bolivian elites found their political expression 
in the right-wing Falange Socialista Boliviana (FSB, 1937). These parties fulfilled the 
class-based cleavages that emerged in the context of economic decline in the 1930s. 
However, their influence was unstable and short-lived. By 1950, for example, the PIR 
had already split, and a portion of the former PIR members formed the Partido 
Comunista de Bolivia (PCB). By the time of the National Revolution in 1952, the POR 
and the FSB had each factionalized into 14 different groups, and the PCB had divided 
into nine different groups. These factions reflected the importance of caudillos and 
private interests in party organization at that time (Calderón 1989, 203-4).
The longstanding party that did emerge in the 1940s was the MNR. Founded by a 
group of frustrated middle-class politicians, the MNR attracted party members from the 
former PIR as well as from labor, the urban middle classes, and, by 1952, even the rural 
peasants. The trajectory that led the MNR to its position as a “large multigroup social 
coalition” (Mitchell 1977, 5) by the 1952 Revolution was an important one. The MNR
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supported the coup that overthrew the tin baron oligarchy and brought General Gualberto 
Villarroel (1943-1946) to power. VillarroePs government comprised an odd mix of 
primarily inexperienced military officers prone to violence and a faction of the MNR that, 
in flexing its newfound political muscles, began to formulate a party agenda based on far- 
reaching reforms (Klein 1971, 373). When Villarroel was eventually forced from the 
presidential palace and violently killed in 1946,7 the MNR leadership was exiled.
During the following six years, known as the sexenio, the MNR began to actively 
recruit party membership by setting up cells of the MNR party elite and their friends in 
various cities throughout the country. It also courted the labor sector heavily, 
concentrating primarily on “friendly union leaders,” since it viewed this sector as a 
potential ally for its reform-based agenda (Mitchell 1977, 27-29). Two of their primary 
recruitment strategies thus consisted largely of providing local posts to friends and loyal 
militantes and catering to the growing labor sectors through amicable union leaders. In 
essence, the bases of the political party -  which has dominated party-based politics in the 
country since the 1952 National Revolution -  were originally constructed through 
clientelist and corporatist linkages.
The 1930s and 1940s were marked with political instability, the growth of short­
lived and personalist-based political parties, economic crisis, and the decline of the 
country’s single and most important export. The social impact of this decline included 
widespread unemployment and underemployment and the politicization of the 
disenfranchised urban and rural sectors, many of which became organized. In 1939, the
7 He was eventually dragged out to the streets by a mob of students, teachers, and laborers in front o f the 
Presidential Palace, shot, and hanged on a lamppost that directly faces the palace. That lamppost remains 
to this day, perhaps as a reminder to successive presidents o f their potential fate if they do not effectively 
address the demands of the highly mobilized urban and rural lower classes.
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Confederación Sindical de Trabajadores de Bolivia (CSTB) was founded, becoming the 
most important attempt to unify the smaller labor organizations in the country prior to the 
1952 Revolution. The Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros (FSTMB) was 
established in 1944; it later developed into the most active branch of the Central Obrera 
Boliviana (COB) (García, et al. 2004, 34). While encouraged by some governments,8 
these unions were in general systematically and violently repressed. By the period of the 
sexenio, when repression against them was the most pronounced, the unions were 
actively mobilizing against the government.
Thus, by the end of the 1940s, the two-party system that had controlled Bolivian 
politics since the end of the nineteenth century had completely diminished. In its place, a 
set of short-lived and highly fragmented political parties emerged. The MNR was one of 
the few parties to outlive this period; its clientelist and corporatist recruitment strategies 
enabled it to amass party support that crossed both classes and sectors. At the same time, 
the very sectors it was attracting, including the CSTB and the FSTMB, had developed 
their own organizational structures and were becoming increasingly vociferous in their 
demands. The accelerated development of new political actors took place while the 
country experienced a severe economic crisis sparked by the steep decline o f the tin 
industry. It is perhaps not surprising that in the context of rapid political change, 
economic crisis, and growing social upheaval that a revolution would take place. The 
next section examines the 1952 National Revolution and the MNR-based single-party 
system that emerged upon its successful transformation of Bolivia’s political system.
8 During the military regime of David Toro Ruilova (1936-1937), the unionization o f mines was mandatory 
in cities like Oruro (Garcia 33).
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After the Revolution: the MNR and Single-Party Rule (1952-1964)
On the morning o f April 9, 1952, the MNR led a group of civilians to take over 
the government of Hugo Ballivián Rojas (1951-1952). What began as a rather 
straightforward coup d’état turned into a countrywide rebellion, as groups of mobilized 
miners .fabriles, track drivers, university students, and campesinos joined forces with the 
MNR in toppling Ballivián (García, et al. 2004, 37). The fighting lasted three days and 
brought the MNR to power, with Víctor Paz Estenssoro as president. The initial 
accomplishments of the so-called National Revolution were numerous and notable. The 
new regime granted universal suffrage to all adults, age eighteen and older, and reduced 
what was left of the army to a minimum. The government also nationalized all minerals 
and created the Corporación Minera de Bolivia (COMIBOL) to manage their extraction. 
They founded the Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB) to control the 
extraction and exportation of the country’s hydrocarbon reserves. Finally, the MNR-led 
government established a new national labor federation, called the Central Obrera 
Boliviana (COB), to oversee the organization of labor at the national level.
In instituting all of these reforms, the MNR built upon the support base it had 
begun to amass prior to the revolution and captured the loyalty of the unions, the rural 
campesinos, and the growing middle class. Capitalizing on this overwhelming support, 
Paz Estenssoro organized the MNR in an effort to make it the “political vertebrae” to 
which all segments of society were attached (Malloy 1977, 465). With the party’s fingers 
on the pulse of each sector, the government would in theory have relative autonomy to 
assert its authority and dominance on the national stage.
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Rhetorically speaking, the project of the MNR was largely a populist one. As a 
“large multigroup social coalition,” the party supported a broad range of ambiguous 
national goals that appealed to many different groups from each of the classes. For 
example, it pitted the Bolivian “nación ” that is, Bolivian workers, the middle class, and 
peasants, against the “anti-nación,” or la rosea and its allies, in an effort to consolidate 
the loyalty of the wide majority of the population that had not benefited from the tin 
industry. Maintaining this broad support, however, was not as easy as receiving it 
initially. While the government worked to accomplish its own specific priorities, it 
responded to the growing discontent and demands of the members of its coalition by 
distributing jobs and resources in an effort to maintain internal control (Grindle 2003, 
336).
Indeed, the original intentions of the MNR when it sparked the 1952 Revolution 
were far from revolutionary. As in 1943, the party supported unconstitutional means of 
gaining power in order to force itself into government. In 1952, their goal was to 
maintain power á la the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) in Mexico or the 
Acción Democrática (AD) in Venezuela. The MNR had not anticipated, however, the 
massive support it would receive from the highly mobilized unions and campesinos. 
“Reluctant revolutionaries,” the party was unprepared to effectively manage the 
revolutionary changes that they spearheaded after April 1952 (Klein 1992, 231). It is in 
part for this reason that the MNR could not successfully control through co-optation the 
groups that had helped it come to power.
Two groups had particular influence during the revolution and remained 
influential after the MNR took over the government. For one, the peasantry was highly
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mobilized, and, having been armed in the days leading up to the Revolution, potentially 
violent. They organized campesino unions and created formal militias that patrolled the 
countryside. The armed threat that the campesinos posed largely served as the impetus 
for the widespread land reform that the MNR pushed through in 1953 (Klein 1992, 234). 
The second group that wielded unprecedented political influence was the newly formed 
COB. The MNR established the COB in an effort to control through integration the 
powerful leader of the FSTMB, Juan Lechín Oquendo. Formed as an “organization of 
social organizations”,9 the COB originally had an active role in the first MNR 
administration. By allowing the COB to serve with the MNR under the principle of co- 
gobierno,10 the MNR sought to control the more militant branches of the Central, 
including the FSTMB. This strategy backfired, however, and the COB became a “semi­
sovereign institution that challenged the MNR’s every move” (Gamarra and Malloy 
1995,403).
The importance of the FSTMB-tumed-COB should not be unexpected. As a 
longstanding mono-exporting country, the nature of Bolivia’s economy had consequences 
for the labor movement. Whereas other countries instituted ISI as a growth strategy in 
the mid-twentieth century, Bolivia’s export-based economy was extended until the 1970s, 
putting the miners in a uniquely powerful position of negotiation vis-a-vis the state 
(Ibáñez 1998, 362-3). As a result, the power of the COB continually grew throughout the
9 The COB included, at its foundation, the FSTMB, the Confederación de Trabajadores Fabriles, 
Confederación Ferroviaria, Federación de Empleados de Bancos y  Ramas Afines, Sindicato Gráfico, 
Empleados del Comercio e Industria, Sindicato de Constructores y  Albañiles, Sindicato de Planificadores, 
and the Confederación de Campesinos y  Federación Agraria (García,et al. 2004, 38).
10 COB members named three labor ministers to the first cabinet. Lechín was named the Minister o f Mines 
and Petroleum (Klein 1992, 232).
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1950s and 1960s. During this time, the Central functioned organizationally at a level that
was on par with the state. As previously mentioned, its members had high positions in
the MNR-led government. At the same time, high-ranking government officials
including, at one point, President Paz, participated actively in the COB’s organizational
structure. The COB’s First Congress on October 31, 1954, for example, included the
attendance of Paz and other high-ranking MNR delegates (Garcia, et al. 2004, 38).
Like the MNR, the COB functioned in a hierarchical, corporatist manner. Made
up, at its bases, of myriad local unions, the Central organized itself into regional and then
national federations and confederations, with the Executive National Committee (CEN, in
Spanish) at the organization’s peak. The influence of the COB over its members was all-
consuming. As one author notes, for COB union members,
“Ya sea en el campo, la mina, la fábrica, el comercio o la actividad artesanal, la 
manera de adquirir identidad palpable ante el resto de las personas y  de ser 
reconocido como interlocutor válido por las autoridades gubernamentales, es por 
medio del sindicato. Ahí queda depositada la individualidad social plausible, y  el 
sindicato se erige como el interlocutor tácito entre sociedad civil y  Estado” 
(García, et al. 2004, 43).
The COB functioned as a representative body for its members. Bolivian laborers of all 
shades defined themselves through the COB, and the COB represented that identity at the 
national level.
The growing political strength and popularity of the COB throughout Bolivia 
helped bring the demands of the workers to the national level. Its call for workers’ rights, 
better wages, and other services contradicted the developmental aims of the MNR, which 
sought to pursue national growth through government austerity. These contradictory 
logics o f consumption on the one hand and accumulation on the other (Malloy 1970)
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created serious tensions between the MNR and the COB, particularly in light of the 
country’s deepening economic crisis in the 1950s. By 1953, the country was essentially 
bankrupt and the government was having difficulties providing food and other staples to 
the population. Looking for financial relief, Paz Estenssoro signed a mineral purchasing 
agreement with the United States in exchange for twice the amount of aid to the country 
and millions of dollars worth of food (Klein 1992, 238). This assistance from the United 
States, while providing only temporary respite from the economic crisis, deepened 
Bolivia’s external dependence on aid and aggravated tensions with the COB.
These tensions were exacerbated further when the government, under the 
leadership of Hernán Siles Zuazo (1956-1960), implemented an IMF-imposed 
stabilization program to curb rising inflation. Rather than confront the ire of the miners 
and other labor sectors over this agreement, Siles Zuazo and his successor, Paz 
Estenssoro (1960-1964), worked to increasingly exclude labor from governmental 
negotiations by actively demobilizing the COB. At the same time, Paz Estenssoro was 
quietly strengthening the military once more, in an attempt to reassert the state’s 
monopoly of authority over the armed urban and rural sectors of Bolivian society (Malloy 
1977, 473). In essence, the MNR was cutting the government off from the very social 
sectors that had brought it to power, while simultaneously feeding the political force that 
would eventually topple it in 1964. Thus, by the time the MNR’s twelve-year rale had 
come to a close, economic crisis had largely overshadowed the revolutionary 
achievements of the 1950s, and the political dominance of the MNR had been surpassed 
by the revitalized military and the ever-stronger labor sector.
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In the twelve years of single party rale after the 1952 National Revolution, the 
MNR made many attempts to construct a cross-class, catch-all party bonded to society 
through clientelist and particularly corporatist linkages. Instead of successfully co-opting 
and integrating the organized sectors of Bolivian society to which it appealed, however, 
the MNR failed to integrate and control these sectors and, specifically, the COB. In 
essence, the MNR was unable to establish itself as the primary intermediary between the 
state and society. Instead, it inadvertently bolstered the role of the COB and the military, 
creating two powerful and enduring political actors who would straggle for political 
dominance from 1964 until the transition to democracy in 1982.
The Period o f  Military Rule (1964-1978)
Indeed, when a military regime overthrew Paz Estenssoro’s government in 1964, 
a new period of politics began in Bolivia. For one, the formal political dominance of the 
military was constantly clashing with the intransigent political force represented by labor. 
The years of military rule were marked by an almost total repression of the COB.
Notably, this period was the first since 1952 in which the COB was controlled by and 
subordinated to the state. The mines, for example, were declared military zones in the 
late 1960s in an effort to neutralize the negotiating power of the FSTMB. In the 1970s, 
with the arrival of the anti-left and extremely conservative regime of Colonel Hugo 
Banzer Suárez, the COB was actively dismantled. By July 1975, almost all of the union 
leaders had been incarcerated or forced into hiding (Garcia, et al. 2004, 59).
Throughout the 1960s and into the early part of the 1980s, the COB experienced 
serious blows to its organizational structure by successive military regimes that forcefully 
worked towards its eradication. Yet, the Central never entirely disappeared. It continued
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to resist each military regime either clandestinely or openly and, at one point, was even 
allowed to overtly organize at the national level.11 The reformist regimes of the 1960s 
and early 1970s were eventually toppled by a far more conservative and repressive 
section of the military headed by Colonel Banzer. Along with banishing political parties, 
Banzer jailed leaders of the COB and diminished the importance of the campesino 
groups, which had been actively courted by both the Barrientos and Torres 
administrations. Under this environment of centralized control, Bolivia experienced its 
first economic boom in years (Klein 1992, 261).
Ironically, improvements in the economy also led to a resurgence in political 
activity by the COB and the FSTMB. In 1976, at their National Congress, the miners 
called for a hunger strike that lasted for four weeks before the armed forces could 
suppress it. Their protest fueled growing demands for the return of the exiled labor and 
political leaders, the reorganization of labor, and even elections (Lazarte 1991, 587). The 
COB’s success with initiatives such as this hunger strike reflected a growing 
disenchantment throughout the country towards Banzer and his regime. Indeed, as the 
COB grew in terms of support and unity, Banzer’s popularity -  and popularity for 
military regimes in general -  began to decline sharply. By 1978, it was clear that military 
leadership had run its course in Bolivia. In July of that year, Banzer succumbed to the 
growing internal resistance and called for democratic elections (Malloy and Gamarra 
1988, 117).
11 In June 1970, with the collaboration in part o f the government o f General Juan José Torres (1970-1971), 
the COB organized a Popular Assembly {Asamblea del Pueblo), The Assembly, which included the 
participation o f 218 delegates from campesino groups and labor unions, among others, was intended to 
replace the former Bolivian parliament (Klein 1992, 253). While it failed to materialize into a functioning 
national body, the Popular Assembly did serve as an expression of the COB’s resilience throughout the 
entire military period.
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The impact of this fourteen-year military period would be felt well beyond its 
formal conclusion12 at the end of the 1970s. It left behind two clear legacies that, as the 
following chapters will show, continued to affect political representation in the country 
long after the transition to democracy. One clear legacy of this period of military rale 
was the use of corporatism and clientelist-based patrimonialism by successive leaders for 
controlling society and maintaining support for their non-constitutional rule. Under the 
leadership of René Barrientos Ortuño (1964-1969°), for example, the government 
actively courted the support of the rural campesinos, strengthening a Pacto Militar 
Campesino (PMC) between this sector and the government. As a part of the PMC, the 
campesinos were organized into vertically structured groups that were controlled by local 
garrison commands (Gray-Molina 2003, 350). Barrientos clearly employed a corporatist 
logic in integrating the rural sectors into his government.
Other examples of corporatism abound during this period. In the 1970s, when the 
COB had been declared illegal, Banzer organized labor through the establishment of 
1000 coordinadores legales that were appointed by the Ministry of Labor (Lazarte 1991, 
584). Despite banning unionization during this time, these legal coordinators clearly 
retained vertical structures for addressing labor, much in the same way that the COB did. 
In 1974, on the heels of his autogolpe, Banzer also organized a corporatist-based 
assembly without the participation of political parties (Gamarra 2003b, 295). These 
examples demonstrate how the military sought to represent the country through sectoral
12 The military period formally ended in 1978, that is, elections were carried out in 1979 to replace the 
military regime. Yet, as the next section will demonstrate, the institution did not willingly cede its power. 
Its attempts to retain control o f the government through 1982 would lead some scholars to call this four- 
year period one o f “tortuous transition” (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 117).
13 In actuality, Barrientos co-governed with General Alfredo Ovando until July 1966.
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interests instead of through political parties. In each case, labor was treated as a unified 
body to be addressed directly by government.
Clientelism was also pervasive during this time, particularly towards the end of 
the military period. By the end of the 1970s, for example, Banzer could no longer focus 
on restructuring the state and encourage economic growth as he had done during his first 
years in office. His popularity was, in fact, deteriorating rapidly. Thus, he turned his 
energies to maintaining control of the government through the distribution of jobs, 
contracts, tax breaks, and concessions -  whatever he could do to muster enough support 
for his regime to continue (Gamarra and Malloy 1995, 408). Indeed, with Banzer, the 
military institution in general became known for its clientelist-based patrimonial 
behavior. Under his centralized authority, the entire state apparatus was reduced to a 
mere extension of the executive branch, around which all political and economic activity 
revolved. As a result, the primary state-society linkage at this time centered on 
“extremely fluid lines of personalized patron-client links” emanating from Banzer 
(Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 110).
The neopatrimonial nature of Banzer’s rule should not be surprising, as it was a 
tendency that dominated politics in the country since before the National Revolution. 
Patrimonialism emerged in Bolivia as a result of the country’s prolonged dependence 
upon publicly managed primary-product exportation, which stifled private sector growth 
and centralized economic and job-producing resources into the state. Thus, the urban, 
educated, job-seeking population in Bolivia inevitably turned to the state for 
employment, converting the country’s middle class into its political class (Malloy 1977, 
476). By providing jobs, successive political leaders secured the support of those urban
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sectors, fostering a relationship based on mutual patron-client dependence. The middle 
classes turned to politics as a means of employment; support for both military and 
civilian rulers alike was thus based on their ability to employ. In Banzer’s case, this job- 
based support translated into the dramatic growth of the public sector from 66,000 
employees in 1970 to 171,000 employees in 1977 (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 112),
The dominance of the military along with the COB after 1964 highlights the 
second important legacy of the period. In effect, the role of the traditional political 
parties on the national scene was significantly reduced. For example, the MNR, after 
having ruled for twelve years, virtually disappeared during this time, although it did serve 
a subordinate (and temporary) role with Banzer’s government in the early 1970s.14 In 
general, however, as the military and labor were in outright conflict over political control 
in Bolivia, it was increasingly evident that political parties were not the sole intermediary 
between state and society. The representative role of successive military rales and the 
COB matched that of the political parties. Political parties suffered as a result. Like the 
POR, FSB, and the PCB of the 1940s, the MNR experienced a period of serious internal 
fragmentation in the 1970s, weakening the party’s overall structure and diminishing even 
further its national importance. At one point, the MNR was split into 31 different 
factions (Calderón 1989, 202).
An important role that political parties did serve during this period was that of 
opposition to the military regimes. This was particularly the case of Banzer’s leadership
14 When Bánzer first came to power in 1971, he briefly shared government with the MNR and the FSB,
This coalition, called the Frente Popular Nacional (FPN), remained in power until 1974, when Banzer 
declared an auto-coup and banished them from office. Scholars have called the MNR and the FSB “rump 
factions” during this period. Bolstering party support through the provision of public sector jobs, they did 
little more than drain resources from Banzer, who wanted control o f the patronage flow for himself (Malloy 
and Gamarra 1988, 109),
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in the 1970s, When the Popular Assembly took place in 1970, the former university 
sector of the MNR organized a group of delegates and participated in the assembly under 
a new name, the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) (Klein 1992, 253). 
After Banzer’s takeover, the MIR served as a principal source o f resistance to the 
repressive military ruler. Two other leftist parties also emerged during this time and 
joined the MIR in opposing Banzer: the leftist faction of the MNR, known as the MNRI, 
under the leadership of Hernán Siles Zuazo, and the Partido Socialista (PS), which was 
headed by Marcelo Quiroga Santa Cruz. Like the COB and the FSTMB, these new 
parties were severely repressed and even abolished after Banzer’s autogolpe (Gamarra 
and Malloy 1995,407).
Ironically, Banzer himself eventually became known as a strong defender of 
democracy. After his call for democratic elections in 1978, the military colonel 
abandoned the military and established the civilian-based political party, Acción 
Democrática Nacionalista (ADN). This ideologically conservative party incorporated 
elements of the former FSB into its program and thus captured the support of the private 
sector and the urban elite who were alienated from the left-leaning opposition parties of 
the 1970s. During the years of tortuous transition, between 1979 and 1982, Banzer 
became a fierce opponent of the military juntas that overthrew the civilian leadership of 
Walter Guevara Arce (August 1979-November 1979) and Lydia Gueiler Tejada 
(November 1979-July 1980).15 As a result, Banzer was perceived as one of the leading
15 Guevara was overthrown in a coup d ’état led by Colonel Alberto Natusch Busch (1-16 November 1979). 
Gueiler was overthrown in a coup d’état headed by General Luis García Meza (July 1980-August 1981),
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proponents of democracy at that time (Klein 1992, 270); his repressive military 
leadership appeared to be all but forgotten by his supporters.
Thus, the 1960s and 1970s represented a time of intense political conflict, 
repression, and resistance. Notably, the political parties had to compete for its role as 
intermediary with the military and the unions. Dominated by linkages based on 
corporatism and clientelist-based neopatrimonialism, this period did not prepare 
Bolivians for the representative democracy to come. The final section will look briefly at 
the country’s difficult transition to democracy and highlight the important characteristics 
of its first and overwhelmingly unsuccessful attempt at coalitional rule.
The Tortuous Transition to Representative Democracy (1979-1985)
The transition period between 1978 and 198216 has been called “one of the 
darkest chapters in Bolivian political history” (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 154) and 
rightly so. In less than four years, the country had seven different leaders, only two of 
which were civilian. General Luis García Meza (July 1980-August 1981) was the single 
most ruthless and repressive leader that Bolivians had known in the twentieth century. 
The sustained and systematic character o f his malevolence “terrified” Bolivian society 
and wrecked havoc on his opponents and particularly labor, the campesinos, the Church, 
and the left-leaning political parties (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 145). Indeed, the 
obstinacy of the military in relinquishing its hold on political power in the country 
prolonged Bolivia’s transition process.
16 For an excellent analysis o f the transition to democracy in Bolivia, see Chapter Four of Malloy and 
Gamarra (1988).
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Yet, the military did eventually surrender national political control, and upon 
Banzer’s call for elections, the political system was exposed to an outpouring of formally 
repressed state and non-state actors who wanted their piece of the democratic action. 
These groups included labor, the peasantry, a newly organized confederation for the 
private sector, and regionally-based civic committees. More than democracy, these 
groups each wanted to fill the power vacuum left behind by the military (Malloy and 
Gamarra 1988, 118). The organizational and political successes of each of these groups 
highlighted the failure of the political parties to capture that vacuum and replace the 
military as the sole intermediary channel between the state and society. This was the case 
even as a coalition o f left-leaning political parties, called the Unión Democrática y  
Popular (UDP),17 was successful in electing their candidate, Hernán Siles Zuazo (1982- 
1985), to the presidency.
The political influence of the COB surged after 1978, primarily because of its 
important role in fomenting resistance to the military prior to the transition to democracy. 
It was clearly in the COB’s interests of survival and growth to topple the military regime. 
In the 1970s, the possibility of democracy presented itself, and the COB pursued it 
doggedly. The hunger strikes and blockades outlined above worked toward this goal. 
Even during the period of García Meza, when the repression of unions was at its height 
(Garcia, et al. 2004, 66), the COB continued to organize and resist the military. The 
COB’s role in bringing the tortuous transition to an end, as well as its extended history of 
political prominence in Bolivia, instilled in the COB a sense of entitlement to political 
power in 1982. As a result, once the UDP assumed power, the COB agreed to work only
17 The UDP consisted of the MNRI, the MIR, and the Partido Comunista de Bolivia (PCB).
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with the executive branch, bypassing political parties and the Congress entirely in the 
pursuit o f its own interests (Gamarra and Malloy 1995, 411). For the COB, direct access 
to the executive was a right they had earned.
Bolivian businesses also became organized after 1978, forming the Confederación 
de Empresarios Privados de Bolivia (CEPB). The CEPB represented private sector 
interests, and, like the COB, it preferred to lobby directly with the executive after 1982. 
Indeed, in terms of political influence at the national level, the CEPB became for the 
private sector what the COB was for the working class (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 169). 
The rural peasantry also organized during the transition period. In 1979, three different
i o  r
campesino organizations came together to form the Confederación Sindical Unica de 
Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB). The CSUTCB, which joined the COB 
in 1981, became the strongest extra-institutional voice for campesinos (Klein 1992, 273) 
and maintained its political relevance into the early 21st century. The COB, CEPB, and 
the CSUTCB represented their constituents along corporatist lines, contradicting the logic 
of what was soon to become a representative democracy.
Another growing political force materialized at the regional level during this time. 
In part due to Banzer’s development of the country’s eastern lowlands, regional rivalries 
developed throughout Bolivia that began to vie for the resources of the state even before 
the transition to democracy. After 1975, however, regional civic committees attracted 
more supporters by questioning the principles of a centralized state (Calderón 1989, 210).
18 In 1978, three autonomous peasant confederations existed: the Confederación Nacional de Campesinos 
(CNC), which had coordinated the PMC; the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Katari (MRTK), which 
would later become a political force in the 1980s and 1990s; and Movimiento Indio Tupac Katari 
(MITKA), also a political party at that time (Malloy and Gamarra 124-5). By 1979, the leaders o f the three 
organizations came together to join a unified confederation, called the Confederación SindicalÚnica de 
Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB).
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They maximized their political backing by capitalizing on the clearly unstable and 
vacuous central authority at that time. Their call for regional autonomy never subsided, 
and it became a primary issue in the post-2003 political context.
The political parties that emerged during this time did so in a context of weak 
political power vis-a-vis the other rival political actors. Yet, once the ban on political 
parties was lifted in 1978, more than seventy parties formed, the majority of which were 
merely an expression of personal ambitions. Called “taxi parties,” Bolivians joked that 
the parties could “hold their conventions in a taxi cab” (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 124). 
The larger and more important political parties, including the MNR, the ADN, the UDP, 
and even the FSB also capitalized on this period to gain political support.
What the parties did not lack in terms of quantity, they did lack with respect to the 
experience needed to manage the atrophied nature of national politics after 1978. Indeed, 
the presence and strength of the non-party actors during the transition reflected the initial 
failure of the political parties to fill the political vacuum left behind by the military. As 
party politicians battled with the military for control of the state, it was clear that there 
was no central governing authority to effectively manage the country. Interests were thus 
represented by the COB, CSUTCB, CEPB, and the Civic Committees. The sustained 
presence of these groups even after the arrival of the UDP to power reflects a much more 
problematic consequence of the transition period: the parties were unable to recapture 
political power once the chaos of the transition had subsided.
The inability of the political parties to assert political control in the country 
became apparent during the leadership o f Hernán Siles Zuazo of the UDP (1982-1985). 
The coalition had problems from the start. Despite their ideological similarities, the
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MNRI, MIR, and PCB had different goals for the administration. As a result, the 
coalition began to fragment internally. The MIR became disaffected first. Unhappy with 
what they perceived as Siles’ reliance upon international technocrats, his inability to 
confront the emerging cocaine organizations, and his general lack of an economic plan, 
the six MIRista ministers collectively resigned from the president’s cabinet (Malloy and 
Gamarra 1988, 168). Internal disagreements and fragmentations throughout the 
administration forced Siles to spend much of his time shuffling his cabinet and putting 
out political fires with his allies.
Meanwhile, Bolivians were suffering the effects of an already acute economic 
crisis.19 Mounting international pressures to enact an austere economic program resulted 
in the adoption o f a series of IMF-sponsored austerity packages designed to stabilize the 
economy. These measures contradicted the ideology of the coalitional government and 
ran counter to the demands of the coalition’s principal supporters and particularly the 
COB (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 164). The government’s capitulation to international 
demands angered the COB, which ultimately distanced itself from the UDP.
The independence of the COB vis-a-vis the left-leaning political parties in the 
UDP reflected those parties’ inability to maintain the overwhelming support their 
coalition had received upon assuming office in 1982. Indeed, the Central exerted unusual 
influence over the coalition’s economic and political decisions. For example, in 1983, 
when Siles’ coalitional unity was faltering, the president invited the COB to join him in 
co-goveming the country. His invitation was an attempt to control the organization by
19 The crisis, which began in the 1970s, accelerated under UDP rule. The growth rate o f the gross national 
product (GNP) was falling, as was the GNP per capita: in 1981, this figure had fallen 4.1%, and by 1982, it 
had dropped another 11.1%. Exports died off while the fiscal deficit almost doubled (Mayorga, R. 1987, 
23).
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integrating it into government while also a clear appeal to the COB as his strongest non­
state supporter. As a result, the COB produced a Programa de Emergencia, spelling out 
its conditions for establishing co-gobierno, including miners5 control of COMIBOL, 
workers’ co-management of all other state enterprises, and the immediate postponement 
o f all foreign debt servicing (Urioste 1987, 289). Before the UDP could reject or accept 
this Program -  they negotiated over the deal for months -  the COB withdrew its offer for 
co-gobierno, ultimately opting in 1984 to actively resist the UDP and push for a more 
socialist government. By this time, the Central had become such a potent political force 
that one author concluded that no government would ever be able to ignore the COB in 
formulating an economic plan. The organization had become too powerful (Castro and 
Gomez 1987, 196).
The growing role of the COB in government alarmed the CEPB. Strongly 
opposed to the socialist tendencies o f the COB, it began to act more vociferously in the 
defense o f private sector interests. The intense and enduring conflicts that emerged 
between the CEPB and the COB would complicate Siles’ governing capacities (Malloy 
and Gamarra 1988, 169-172). The president tried to appease the antagonistic groups 
through efforts of concertación, hoping to win the support of the CEPB and the COB by 
making concessions to both of them. The attempts were unsuccessful, however, and Siles 
ended up satisfying neither group entirely (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 174). By 1985, it 
was clear that the UDP was unable to effectively subordinate other national political 
forces to its party-based political system. Indeed, the popularity o f groups like the COB 
and the CEPB appeared to be growing.
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Thus, although the UDP represented the first instance of political party rule in the 
country after more than thirty years, it became clear very quickly that political parties did 
not have a monopoly of representation or political control in Bolivia. In particular, the 
COB and the CEPB appeared to be capturing the support of new societal cleavages based 
upon growing class differences. The COB’s strength and influence intensified during this 
period, suggesting that it had retained the support of most of its urban poor and rural 
followers despite the election of a left-leaning coalition. The CEPB became increasingly 
organized in reaction to the COB, capturing the support of those urban sectors alarmed by 
the Central’s growing influence. Thus, although the military had effectively disappeared 
from national politics by the early 1980s, the fragility o f the party-based coalition in 
power, along with the emergence and growing influence of non-state actors during that 
time, demonstrated the weak grip that political parties had over Bolivian society. Party- 
society linkages of any kind by 1985 were largely absent.
Conclusion
The failure o f the UDP government brought to a close a tumultuous and 
politically unstable era of history in Bolivia. Beginning with the dismantling of the two- 
party system of Liberals and Conservatives in the 1940s, centralized national control in 
the country continually unraveled throughout the rest of the twentieth century, despite 
different attempts to transform the political system. The National Revolution sought to 
restructure the country by opening up politics to greater participation and leveling the 
political playing field between different classes and ethnicities. The military period 
sought to stimulate economic growth and political order through mechanisms of social
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control. The UDP attempted to incorporate different political actors into its decision­
making process. In compromising with everyone, the coalition satisfied no one.
The legacies of these different political periods would not bode well for 
representative democracy. For one, there existed a strong tendency by most political 
actors, including the military, the COB, and the political parties, to appeal to society 
along corporatist and clientelist lines. Thus, the tradition of representation through 
political parties (instead of through different sectors of society) was cultivated only 
through the establishment of highly dependent patron-client networks. In effect, the role 
o f political parties as the sole intermediary between state and society was increasingly 
challenged by that of other political actors, including the COB and the military, 
throughout much of the second half of the 20th century in Bolivia.
Because the traditional political parties were unable to emerge as the primary 
state-society intermediary before 1985, the linkages that those parties could create with 
society were extremely limited. The MNR government of 1952 and the UDP government 
of 1982 both employed mechanisms of corporatism, and, in the case of the MNR, 
clientelism, to appeal to and maintain the support of the population at large. These were 
the only two instances of clearly established party rule after the 1940s. The rest of the 
period saw other political actors, including the military and labor, actively working 
against parties for their own political gain. In most instances, the political parties lost the 
battle for national control:
“Estos intentos reiterados de eliminar a los partidos y  de establecer vínculos sin 
intermediarios entre los ciudadanos y  el Estado ocurrieron durante momentos 
autoritarios y  afectaron, a la larga, la capacidad de los partidos de forjar 
vínculos más amplios con la sociedad’ (Calderón and Gamarra 2003, 15).
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Thus, by 1985, links between political parties and society were extremely 
tenuous. Notions of corporatism and clientelist-based neopatrimonialism plagued 
political behavior, and other non-state actors had emerged that could hold their own in 
the straggle for political power. Given the dramatically unstable environment in which 
elections took place in 1985, it was remarkable that a political system was finally forged 
that, in spite of the legacies of the fifty years past, could ensure governance and stability 
in the country. Entering into the “honeymoon period” of the political party system 
(Chávez, et al. 2004), however, the consequences of the political and economic reforms 
of that year were not entirely positive. Chapter Three looks at the period of stable party 
system rule in Bolivia, making the case for why the party system — despite its emergence 
against all odds in 1985 -  was ultimately unsustainable.
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III. THE BOLIVIAN POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM
In 1985, although Bolivia’s economic and political systems were close to 
shambles, the country was able to pull off a successful round of free and fair elections. 
Víctor Paz Estenssoro, who became president for the third time that year, and his 
administration instituted a coalition-style government, based on the principle of pacted 
democracy, and at the same time implemented a strict economic austerity package, called 
the Nueva Política Económica (NPE). These two reforms stabilized the economy and 
relocated political authority in the state, allowing for the successful formulation of four 
more administrations between 1989 and 2002. As the pages to follow demonstrate, 
pacted democracy and the NPE also impacted the traditional political party system’s 
ability to maintain its linkages with society.
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, it will examine in detail the 
components of both pacted democracy and the NPE, as well as the successes of each in 
returning the locus of political and economic control to the state. In particular, they 
enabled reforms in the 1990s that would not have been possible prior to the democratic 
transition given the atrophied nature of politics during that time. Yet, pacted democracy 
and the NPE had a detrimental impact on the linkages that existed between society and 
the state at the same time that the traditional political party system took over the role as 
sole intermediary. For one, the corporatist linkages fostered by the COB were essentially 
eradicated with the Central’s demise after the adoption of the NPE. Meanwhile, the 
principle of pacted democracy promoted the neopatrimonial behaviors that dominated the 
political system prior to the transition to representative democracy. It also fostered 
executive-centric policymaking and a strong internal political party hierarchy, preventing
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party democratization and inhibiting the formation of party-society linkages beyond that 
of clientelist-based neopatrimonialism.
The second objective of the chapter is to outline the growing economic and social 
problems in Bolivia by the end of the 1990s. As the country entered into an extended - 
economic recession, Bolivian society underwent social changes fueled by the crisis. 
These changes included the increase of unemployment and underemployment with a 
simultaneous rise in university graduates. At the same time, new political parties and 
social movements emerged that expressed different sectors’ discontent toward the 
traditional political party system and threatened the monopoly of representation secured 
by that system since 1985. As Roberts argues in his party-society framework, by the end 
of the 1990s, the conditions were set in Bolivia for the dealignment of the traditional 
political parties from society. Facing prolonged economic crisis and social change, the 
traditional political party system confronted major shifts in societal demands.
Thus, the following pages address the successes of the economic and political 
models adopted in 1985 as well as their unintended consequences for the linkages that 
connected the traditional political party system with society. Given the economic crisis 
and the subsequent social changes of the late 1990s, the limitations of the existing 
clientelist-based linkage would become evident as different Bolivian sectors turned their 
support toward the newly formed political parties and social movements. Ironically, the 
successes of the 1985 political and economic model would ultimately be detrimental to 
the traditional political party system’s monopoly of representation in the country, setting 
the stage for party system decline after 2000.
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The Era o f  Policy-Making: Pacted Democracy and the NPE
The outcome of the 1985 presidential elections was close; indeed, elections 
between 1985 and 2002 never produced a simple majority winner.20 Whereas the ADN’s 
candidate, Hugo Bánzer, received the highest number of popular votes, the MNR’s 
second place finisher, Paz Estenssoro, eventually assumed the presidency. Despite anger 
among party factions in both the ADN and the MNR, the two party leaders forged a pact 
that put Paz Estenssoro in the presidency and guaranteed that the ADN would support his 
leadership by creating an MNR-friendly congressional majority. The legislative coalition 
would back Paz Estenssoro in exchange for the MNR’s support for an ADN presidency in 
1989.
The MNR-ADN coalition, which was called the Pacto por la Democracia, would 
be the first of five coalitions formulated under the principle of pacted democracy. This 
innovative approach to governance was successful in resolving any potential impasse 
between the president and the legislature in Bolivia, ensuring political stability on the one 
hand and governance on the other. Indeed, because they could count on the support of a 
Congressional majority, the successive presidents between 1985 and 2002 were 
successful in implementing important social, political, and economic reforms. Given the 
historic struggle for power and authority that existed in the country prior to 1985, the 
accomplishments o f pacted democracy cannot be overstated. It was clear from the 
beginning of the MNR-ADN alliance that conditions for a “stable and conventional 
regime” had been set in the country (Whitehead 2001, 28).
20 Article 90 of the 1967 Constitution stipulated that, if no presidential candidate received 50% of the votes 
plus one, the President would ultimately be elected by Congress in a second round race among the top three 
popular vote recipients. In 1994, this rule was changed so that only the top two recipients could be 
considered for President.
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The principle of pacted democracy also underscored the nature of the democratic 
regime that was put into place in 1985. Called a “hybrid presidential” regime, Bolivia’s 
government consisted of both parliamentary and presidential characteristics (Gamarra 
1997» 363-4). As mentioned above, if first round general presidential elections did not 
gamer a majority (50% plus one) winner, the Congress was responsible for electing the 
president. All in all, the “mainspring of the system [was] a dynamic common in 
parliamentary regimes: the politics of coalition” (Mayorga, R.1997, 149). Electoral 
coalitions allowed parties to appeal broadly to their constituents, and coalitions within 
Congress chose the president. Once the president had been chosen, however, the 
principles o f presidentialism took over. The legislative function there after served to 
support the coalitional government in place, and the executive branch was not beholden 
to parliamentary confidence.
Thus, the primary political actors after 1985 were the political parties that 
comprised each ruling coalition. While the transition to democracy had produced more 
than seventy different political parties, the actual alternation of power after 1985 was 
focused on the three traditional political parties, the MNR, the MIR, and the ADN. This 
was due in part to a political reform in 1979, which abruptly halted the explosion of 
political parties by requiring those parties that did not receive 50,000 votes in a given 
election to pay for their share of ballot printing costs (Van Cott 2000, 166). The reform 
helped establish a political party system consisting primarily of the three traditional 
political parties, because they had the financial and political resources to fulfill the 
requirements of the 1979 legislation.
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From 1985 to 2002, then, the MNR, MIR, and ADN, as the traditional parties in
the country’s political party system, alternated the presidency. Between 1985 and 1989,
Paz Estenssoro led the Pacto por la Democracia. In the period of 1989-1993, Jaime Paz
Zamora (MIR) became president with the support of the Acuerdo Patriótico, an alliance
between the MIR, the ADN, and the small, Christian Democrat party, the Partido
Demócrata Cristiano (PDC). After 1993, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (MNR, 1993-
1997) assumed office through the Pacto por la Gobernabilidad. This coalition included
the MNR along with the MRTK, an MIR spin-off called the Movimiento Bolivia Libre
(MBL), and the Unión Cívica Solidaridad (UCS). In 1997, Hugo Bánzer (ADN, 1997- 
212002) became the president with the support of the Compromiso por Bolivia, a coalition 
that consisted of the MIR, UCS, PDC, Conciencia de Patria (CONDEPA), and the Nueva 
Fuerza Republicana (NFR).
The composition of each successive coalition is noteworthy. For one, pacted 
democracy clearly brought together parties that, programmatically speaking, were 
complete opposites. The Acuerdo Patriótico, for example, consisted o f the MIR and the 
ADN -  two parties that were ideological antitheses. Moreover, while the three traditional 
political parties headed each of these coalitions, it is notable that other small parties allied 
with the MNR, MIR, or ADN in order to gamer the seats necessary for a congressional 
majority. Over time, these coalitions grew: whereas the Pacto por la Democracia had 
only two political parties, the Compromiso por Bolivia included six. The evolution of 
these pacts highlights three electoral features of Bolivia’s political party system. First, in
21 In 2000, Banzer resigned because of serious complications from an illness, which would eventually take 
his life. His vice president, Jorge Quiroga, assumed the presidency after his resignation and served out the 
rest o f the term.
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the straggle for the presidency, none of the traditional political parties ever received a 
clear majority. Second, the voting share of each of the parties rarely grew and in most 
cases dropped with each successive election; hence the need for a greater number of 
parties to obtain a majority. Finally, the appearance of new political parties suggests that, 
while the traditional parties maintained primary control of the party system, they were 
unsuccessful in maintaining their constituent base over the medium to long term.
At the same time that the principle of pacted democracy was adopted, Paz 
Estenssoro and his administration were also working frantically to implement a package 
of economic reforms that could effectively address the “perilous state” of the Bolivian 
economy in 1985 (Grindle 2003, 323). On August 29, 1985, the president enacted 
Supreme Decree 21060, or the Nueva Política Económica (NPE), as his response to the 
crisis. An orthodox economic shock program, the objectives o f the NPE were to end 
hyperinflation and adopt the foundations of a market-oriented economy. Measures 
incorporated into the NPE included devaluation, liberalization, wage and salary freezes, 
and the reduction of the public sector. Called a “silent revolution,” the NPE represented 
a completely new approach to economic development, changing the former model of 
state-based growth and opening the economy to foreign investment and trade (Mayorga, 
R, 1997).
The NPE was initially successful in curbing inflation and stimulating growth. By 
1987, inflation had fallen from its 1985 peak of 20,000 percent to a much more 
manageable 14.5 percent. The GNP registered positive growth, at 4.7 percent, and per 
capita income had climbed almost US$200.00 from its 1985 figure to US$620.00 
(Grindle 2003, 324). Following his predecessor’s lead, when Jaime Paz Zamora (1989-
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1993) took over the presidency, he continued with the austere economic principles 
adopted in 1985. In particular, in 1990 he issued Supreme Decree 22407, which
continued to privatize industry and downsize the public sector. By 1992, 100 of the 159 
state-owned enterprises had been sold to the private sector (Grindle 2003, 324).
The implementation of the NPE represented one of the first decisive actions of the 
Pacto por la Democracia, leaving little doubt that the locus of political and economic 
control had been returned to the state. Yet, upon announcing the policy, Paz Estenssoro 
was met with considerable resistance from the labor unions as represented by the COB. 
The Central wanted to compensate for the austere nature of the NPE by increasing 
workers’ wages. Instead of addressing these demands or attempting to negotiate with the 
COB, as his predecessor Siles Zuazo had done, Paz Estenssoro literally dismantled the 
unions. He shut down union headquarters and arrested their leaders, and he closed 
COMIBOL, which resulted in the laying off of 23,000 of the 28,000 miners (Healy 
1988/1989, 100). Between 1985 and 1987, the total work force in state-owned 
companies fell from 32,000 to 7,000 (Haggard and Kaufman 1995, 203), and by 1988, 
public sector employment had been reduced by 17 percent (Grindle 2003, 324). Under 
SD 22407, these figures presumably declined even more.
The impact of these repressive measures was immediate. The COB was almost 
completely destroyed, its material bases effectively purged because of the massive lay­
offs. By the end of the 1980s, the COB would be little more than a “shadow of its former 
se lf’ at the national level (Healy 1988/1989, 100). Thus, the NPE eradicated one of the
* tVi
most active and influential political actors of the mid- to late 20 century. Moreover, by 
dismantling the Central, Paz Estenssoro effectively removed the corporatist linkage that
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had connected the COB with society. As one author notes, by the end of the 1980s, the 
demands of the COB had been, for all intensive purposes, “pulverized” (Garcia, et al. 
2004, 625).
By breaking down the Central, the corporatist bonds that had unified the labor 
sectors were broken down as well. Consequently, the poor urban and rural classes, who 
had largely identified with and were organized through the COB, found themselves 
without the primary intermediary structure that had represented their demands since the 
National Revolution. These disenfranchised classes would thus need to look elsewhere -  
and presumably to the traditional political party system -  for representation. With the 
adoption of the principle of pacted democracy and the NPE, then, Paz Estenssoro 
effectively set the stage for a period of renewed economic growth and for a democratic 
regime in which the traditional political parties -  and no longer the COB -  would be the 
sole intermediary between society and government.
The effects of these accomplishments were profound in terms of governance. 
Bolstered by four successive rounds of executive-friendly Congressional majorities, the 
1990s served as a decade for implementing innovative political, social, and economic 
policies and laws. After nearly fifty years of unstable regimes, it was significant that, 
beginning in 1985, the country’s political system was finally able to make decisions on 
policy and, more importantly, act upon those decisions.
The achievements of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada’s (MNR, 1993-1997) 
presidency in terms of reforms reflected a clear example of the government’s 
policymaking capabilities after 1985. In 1993, Sánchez de Lozada became the president 
of Bolivia for the first time with the promise of enacting far-reaching reforms that would
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change both the social and political design of the country and its strategy for growth and 
investment. El Plan de Todos included the formal recognition for the first time of the 
rights of the indigenous peoples of the country; the capitalization of state-owned industry, 
through the Law of Capitalization; education reform; and political and fiscal 
decentralization, through the Law of Popular Participation (LPP) and the Law of 
Decentralization.22 Along with El Plan de Todos, constitutional reforms were also 
adopted in 1994, creating single member districts for 50 percent of the seats in Congress’ 
lower house, extending the presidential term to five years, and amending Article 90 so 
that only the top two presidential contenders could be considered in the second round 
congressional elections23 (Gamarra 2003a, 306).
It is important to mention the success of El Plan de Todos and the constitutional 
reforms, because they signal the extent to which the role of political and economic 
decision-making was returned to the Bolivian state. Prior to 1985, as Chapter Two 
describes, political control was divided among many different state and non-state actors. 
In the years following the adoption of the NPE and pacted democracy, this political 
atrophy was no longer evident. Indeed, Bolivia’s political system became a model of 
stability in the region (Interview D, 6 May 2005). Upon eliminating the destabilizing 
threat represented by the corporatist-based demands of the COB and guaranteeing 
legislative support of the executive branch, Bolivia achieved stability and was able to 
govern for the first time in decades.
22 A detailed look at each o f the aspects o f El Plan de Todos is beyond the scope o f this study. However, 
other academics examine the impact o f the Plan’s components, including Gamarra (2002), Grindle (2003), 
Gray-Molina (2003), and Kohl (2003).
23 Previously, the top three candidates could vie for the presidency.
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Throughout the 1990s, Bolivia was heralded internationally for its capacity to 
recover from a difficult transition period and establish a democratic and stable political 
system. Yet, the impact of the successes of pacted democracy and the NPE, including in 
terms of political stability and the introduction of reforms, was not entirely positive. As 
the next section illustrates, the economic and political models adopted after 1985 would 
become seriously problematic for the traditional political party system, underscoring its 
dependence upon neopatrimonialism and weakening the traditional political parties’ 
capacity to forge new linkages with society. Moreover, they inadvertently fostered the 
emergence of new political actors that would challenge the traditional political party 
system’s authority.
Unintended Consequences: Assessing Governance in Bolivia
The principle of pacted democracy and the alternation of political control among 
the three traditional political parties, while creating the conditions for govemability and 
reforms, fostered other outcomes that negatively impacted the traditional political party 
system. Specifically, the nature of pacted democracy promoted neopatrimonialism, 
encouraged executive-centric policymaking, and prevented the internal democratization 
of the political parties. As a result o f these tendencies, the role of the traditional political 
parties within the political system was drastically reduced, limiting their capacity to forge 
linkages with Bolivian society.
The very nature of pacted democracy promoted the neopatrimonial relationships 
that had long connected the political parties to Bolivian society and particularly the 
urban-based middle-cum-political class. The dependence upon coalition-building, 
combined with the ultimate independence of the executive branch from congressional
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confidence, cultivated the tendency for the traditional political parties to focus on 
securing and maintaining inter-party coalitional support. That is, successive but varied 
coalitions of generally the same resource-hungry political parties created governments 
focused on “the recomposition of client-patron networks and [the] redistribution of 
political patronage” (Gamarra 1997» 392). This logic of empleomanía shaped political 
party competition in the formulation of pacts and ensured the survival of the coalition 
once the president was elected. As a result, in order to perpetuate their role in the 
political system, the traditional political parties were often more interested in controlling 
patronage than they were in governing effectively (Gamarra 1997, 376-8).
It is important to remember, too, that one of the measures of the NPE mandated 
the drastic reduction of the public sector. While this was ultimately detrimental to the 
COB, eradicating the organizational and material resources needed to maintain its 
linkages with the poor urban and rural classes, it also had a negative impact on the 
linkages that connected the traditional political parties with the middle class. Because 
politics was essentially “the only game in town” (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 80) for 
urban, middle class job-seekers, when the opportunities for employment were drastically 
reduced through the NPE, the support base of the traditional political parties was also 
severely threatened. The traditional political parties presumably had to scramble to fulfill 
their patronage-based promises in what was left o f the public sector. Thus, the dynamics 
o f the political system reinforced the neopatrimonial role of the traditional political 
parties as patronage pushers, even as their capacity to follow through on those promises 
diminished.
59
Another feature of the post-1985 political system was the executive-centric nature 
of decision-making. The principle of pacted democracy guaranteed the president a 
Congressional majority that would consistently back his policies. With the support of 
this legislative majority assured, the need to work with Congress in formulating policies 
was greatly reduced. As a result, the executive branch controlled most of the decision­
making power. The president and his cabinet were able to largely bypass the political 
parties in Congress in the policymaking process (Gamarra 1997, 375), preferring instead 
to use technocrats for the formulation of policies and to impose those policies through 
executive or supreme decree.
In fact, the extensive use of technocrats and decrees prevailed throughout the 
1980s and 1990s. The clearest example of both of these phenomena occurred with the 
NPE. Dissatisfied with the strategy proposed by the MNR’s own economic team, Paz 
Estenssoro consulted with an independent group of technocrats, including two Harvard 
academics, famed economist, Jeffrey Sachs, and two businessmen, to construct the NPE 
(Conaghan 1992, 216). The NPE actually came into effect with Paz’s Supreme Decree 
21060. Thus, the economic policy was largely a result o f a handful of individuals and a 
presidential decree. Despite boasting a pro-government coalition in an effort to promote 
cooperation between the executive and legislative branches, in this instance the Congress 
was bypassed almost entirely.
Other examples of decretismo and the use o f technocrats abound. Paz Estenssoro 
issued most o f his economic and social reforms through Supreme Decree; Paz Zamora 
followed his predecessor’s lead when he deepened the NPE through SD 22407. Sánchez 
de Lozada’s El Plan de Todos was shaped almost in its entirety by international and
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national advisors who were not affiliated to any political party. MNR party members, for 
example, were not involved in the development of the LPP; ministers were even denied 
access to meetings on the topic (Grindle 2003, 331-332).
The use of technocrats and decrees in the formulation and implementation of 
policy -  particularly in the case of the most important reforms of the period -  fostered the 
perception that political parties were nothing more than electoral vehicles for presidential 
candidates (Interview B, 6 May 2005). Once the president was elected, consultation with 
Congress and with party members in general was not a priority. Thus, the role of the 
political parties in the legislative branch was to provide little more than tacit support to 
executive-induced and executive-formulated policies.
The concentration of decision-making power into the executive branch was 
reinforced by a hierarchical organizational structure within the traditional political parties 
themselves. The leaders of the MNR, MIR, and ADN wielded an unrivalled political 
influence over political party members, reducing the role of those members considerably 
within the party (Calderón and Gamarra 2003, 8-9). Each party leader formulated the 
policies that would be filtered down to, carried out, and supported by the other members 
and representatives of his party. The top-down nature of the traditional political parties 
inhibited internal party democratization and the formulation of local and regional leaders. 
In essence, the traditional party leaders were the political parties.
In recognition of the need to decentralize the hierarchical nature of political 
authority within the parties, Congress passed the Law of Political Parties in 1997. The 
Law imposed gender and ethnic-based quotas for party candidates and called upon the 
parties to develop a primary system through which those candidates would be selected.
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Yet, the traditional political parties failed in their efforts to internally democratize. While 
filled with good intentions, the Law of Political Parties was never actually enforced and 
was only ratified in 1999 (Mayorga, F. 2004). Instead of democratizing internal political 
party structures, the Law only succeeded in raising the expectation that such reforms 
might take place. When they never actually did, a burgeoning mistrust and animosity 
toward the traditional political parties was reinforced (Mayorga, F. 2004).24
Pacted democracy, then, proved to be a double-edged sword for Bolivia’s 
traditional political party system. While creating the conditions for governance and 
policy-making, it also fostered neopatrimonialism and executive-centric policymaking 
and reinforced the internal hierarchical nature of the political parties. In effect, the 
principle o f pacted democracy restricted the role of the primary actors of the political 
system, that is, Bolivia’s traditional political parties. Their responsibilities did not extend 
beyond the promotion of patronage and their duty to implicitly support their party leader 
and, when they were part o f the executive-friendly coalition, their president.25
The severely diminished role of the political parties within the context of pacted 
democracy limited their abilities to foster linkages with society. As one author notes, in
24 In fact, the dislike for the traditional political party system and the three political parties that comprised it 
was evident from early on after the transition to democracy. Many scholars have noted that “opinion polls 
consistently [placed] parties in a highly unfavorable light,” and “politicians and their parties [were] 
perceived as corrupt, and distrust o f politicians is profound” (Domingo 2003, 147 and Gamarra 2003, 12). 
As early as 1989, scholars sought to understand why the MNR, MIR, and the ADN were so strongly 
“questioned” by Bolivian society (Calderón 1989). Clearly, the traditional political parties faced an uphill 
battle in terms of connecting with Bolivian society.
25 That is not to say that the political parties were beholden to remain loyal to the president upon joining the 
pact that elected him. In fact, political parties could and periodically did abandon the ruling coalition and 
join the Congressional opposition. Condepa left the Compromiso por Bolivia (1997-2002) along with the 
NFR, which also was a late joiner to and early abandoner o f Sánchez de Lozada’s second term in office 
(2002-2003). Notably, none o f the three traditional political parties ever abandoned a coalition once they 
joined it.
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the 1990s, the traditional political parties were reduced to little more than electoral 
machines and repartidores de cargos (Interview B, 6 May 2005). Loyal party militants 
during campaign periods were rewarded with jobs and other benefits between election 
cycles, underscoring the neopatrimonial nature of inter-party bargaining in the formation 
o f pacts and keeping party members from addressing the demands of the electorate.
As a result, after 1985 and particularly in the 1990s, the linkage that the 
traditional political parties were able to maintain with society was centered on clientelist- 
based neopatrimonialism and, more specifically, the circulation of jobs. Indeed, job 
distribution in the public sector was widespread through 2002. As Table 3.1 in Appendix 
1 indicates, employment in the non-financial public sector remained steady between 1994 
and 2002, despite the growing economic recession that hit Bolivia after 1998 (discussed 
in detail in the next section). Specifically, in 1994, non-financial public sector employees 
were 7.79% of the estimated economically active population. By 2002, this percentage 
had only dropped marginally to 6.64%. In actual numbers, although the change in public 
sector employment was negative, it represented a total increase of 17,769 workers (IMF 
2000, 2003).
Employment in the central administration alone also remained remarkably steady. 
Between 1994 and 2002, the number of workers in the central administration, taken as a 
percentage of the economically active population, had only diminished by 0.36%. Given 
the deepening economic recession after 1998, the increase in the number of workers 
required to maintain the central administration employment levels as a percentage of the 
active population was notable, particularly given the NPE-mandated decline in public
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sector employment after 1985.26 These figures demonstrate the importance of the 
circulation of state-based jobs in the 1990s. They support the contention that the 
traditional political parties were dependent upon these posts and upon empleomanía in 
general, even when that support contradicted the principles of the state’s economic 
policy.
The adoption of the principle of pacted democracy and the NPE provided an 
unprecedented opportunity in Bolivia’s political history for the traditional political 
parties. By eradicating the political force of other pre-1985 actors such as the COB, the 
traditional political party system became the sole voice of expression and mediation 
between the state and society. Yet, the unintended consequences of political stability, 
that is, the promotion of patrimonialism, executive-centric policymaking, and hierarchical 
internal party structures, diminished the role of the traditional political parties in the 
political system, preventing those parties from fostering linkages with society beyond that 
o f neopatrimonialism. As the next section argues, the strength of this clientelist-based 
linkage would be tested by the serious economic and social changes taking place by the 
end of the 1990s.
Economic Crisis and Social Change in Bolivia in the 1990s
Bolivia’s economy underwent a great deal of fluctuation between 1985 and 2003, 
experiencing periods o f both modest growth and modest decline. Notably, despite the 
privatization measures in 1985, as mandated by the NPE, and the capitalization law 
enacted with Sánchez de Lozada’s Plan de Todos, the country’s growth rates never
26 Between 1998 and 2002, the total number o f workers employed by the central administration increased 
by 5,201 (IMF 2000,2003).
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skyrocketed and rarely climbed above 5% of GNP. Indeed, as one economist asserts, 
since 1950, the country’s average growth rate was just below three percent. At its height, 
growth topped seven percent of GNP in different years during the 1960s and 1970s. 
Negative growth rates reached almost -10 percent of GNP in 1953, dipping again in 1957 
as well as during the UDP administration (UDAPE 2004, 12).
The economic recession of 1998 intensified these fluctuations in growth, 
exacerbating the longstanding unstable nature of Bolivia’s economy. Appendix 1 
includes three different tables that reveal the nature and impact of this recession, which 
lasted for more than five years. Table 3.2 portrays the sharp drop in the annual growth 
rate of Bolivia’s economy, as a percentage of GDP, between 1998 and 1999. From a 
growth rate of over five percent by 1998, the drop to just above zero was quite dramatic, 
especially since it came on the heels of a relatively stable growth period between 1994 
and 1998. The country had yet to recuperate from that drop by 2002, although the rates 
o f growth did increase again after 2000.
Accompanying the ensuing economic recession after 1998 was an increase in 
open unemployment rates, as Table 3.2 also indicates. Importantly, whereas the economy 
began to recover its positive growth rate after 2000, unemployment continued to rise. By 
2003, the rate o f the unemployed topped ten percent. At its height, in 2003, it reached 
12.3 percent. The Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo Laboral y  Agrario (CEDLA) 
has projected that the unemployment rate will remain in the double digits at least through 
2005 (CEDLA, 04/29/05).
Table 3.3 depicts the fiscal deficit between 1985 and 2005 (projected), indicating 
that the debt of the Non-Financial Public Sector (SPNF in Spanish) with pensions had
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reached a level similar to that of 1985» or at the height of the economic crisis of the UDP, 
While the deficit subsequently decreased after peaking in 2002, Table 3.3 demonstrates 
that the government was spending beyond its means throughout the 1990s and even more 
so during the peak of the economic recession at the end of the 1990s. Clearly, the 
principles of economic austerity as advocated by the NPE were no longer being pursued 
by the state. Indeed, since 1990 and most likely before then, Bolivia’s government 
consistently spent more money than It received (UDAPE 2004, 22).
The effects of the post-1998 economic recession extended far beyond the macro- 
economic level. For one, World Bank figures indicate that the gross national income 
(GNI) per capita dropped by nine percent between 1999 and 2003. Whereas the average 
income per capita was US$990 at the end of 1999, that figured had dropped to US$900 
by 2003. The implications of this loss are much more significant given the percentage of 
the population that lives below the poverty line in Bolivia, or 62.7 percent in 1999 (WDI 
2004). Moreover, although government expenditures consistently exceeded Its annual 
budget, spending in most social sectors dropped during this period. As Table 3.4 
indicates, after 1998, investments in basic sanitation and housing and urban planning 
experienced a net decline. Investments in education and culture and health also declined 
after 2000, despite surges In investment in these areas when the economic recession 
began.
The impact of the 1998 economic recession, then, was felt at the individual and 
familial levels. For one, the sharp decrease in per capita incomes aggravated an already 
untenable poverty level in the country. Moreover, the drop in social sector Investment 
exacerbated the government’s inability to address the basic demands of the impoverished
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urban and rural sectors. Notably, despite the social impacts of the economic recession, 
enrollment rates at the university level grew sharply at the end of the 1990s. In 1996, 
total enrollment in public universities was at 151,260 students; the newly enrolled in that 
year accounted for 29,222 of that total. By 2002, the number of total enrolled had 
jumped to 240,428, reflecting an increase of 89,168 students, or 59%. The newly 
enrolled totaled 42,782 in 2002, which denotes a 46% increase in the number of enrolled 
students during the seven-year period (UDAPE Dossier, 2004). The increases in 
enrollment reflected a general demographic boom in the country that occurred in the 
1990s: between 1992 and 2001, the overall population of Bolivia increased by 28.8% 
(M E 2003).
As these data illustrate, Bolivia entered into a period o f economic recession after 
1998 that not only exacerbated the country’s financial debts but also aggravated 
unemployment and underemployment levels. At the same time, university graduation 
rates sky-rocketed along with the country’s overall population, increasing the number of 
educated job-seekers just as employment rates were dropping. By the end of the 1990s, 
then, Bolivia was experiencing the kind of profound economic problems that Roberts 
highlights in his party system decline framework. The social impact o f this growing 
crisis, including a simultaneous increase in an educated population and unemployment, 
fueled a growing frustration among Bolivians toward the political system -  and the 
traditional political parties -  that had enabled such a crisis to take place (Interview A, 4 
May 2005). It is not surprising, then, that just as the frustration toward the traditional 
political parties was mounting, new political parties and social organizations emerged to 
reflect that discontent.
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The Emergence o f  Alternatives to the Traditional Political Party System
The latter-half of the 1990s was marked by the emergence of several new 
political leaders with strong, albeit in some cases ephemeral, popular support. The 
appearance of five political parties during the decade reflected the growing 
“informalization of politics” in Bolivia, that is, a process by which political parties 
developed in the periphery and specifically against the traditional political party 
structures (Lazarte 1991, 595). In particular, the UCS, Condepa, the Movimiento al 
Socialismo (MAS), the Movimiento Indio Pachacuti (MIP), and the NFR came to the 
national fore during the 1990s, representing a growing challenge to the traditional 
political parties’ electoral and political dominance.
The UCS and Condepa were founded in the latter half of the 1980s by Max 
Fernández and Carlos Palenque respectively. Both parties rose to meteoric levels of 
popularity upon their creation, primarily because of the popularity of the two leaders. 
Fernández and Palenque were viewed as humble individuals who, in contrast with the 
elite-bom traditional party leaders, worked hard to get where they were (Mayorga F. 
2003, 104). Fernández, the president of the country’s beer company, used his vast 
material resources to carry out obras visibles (visible works), winning more popular 
support every time he paved a road. Palenque, a television personality for the urban and 
primarily indigenous poor, had broad charismatic appeal because he was culturally 
similar to his constituents: they dressed the same, spoke the same, and carried out the 
same rites and traditions (Lazarte 1991, 594).
Both parties emerged as a popular alternative to the traditional political parties 
because, as one author argues, they fulfilled the role of provider (“asistencialistd’) that
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the traditional parties could not fill given the adoption of both pacted democracy and the 
NPE (Mayorga F. 2003, 104). The campaigns and campaign promises of the UCS and 
Condepa revolved around the provision of hospitals, schools, and playgrounds. Palenque 
and Fernández appeared to give directly from their pockets, presiding over the ribbon- 
cutting ceremony of each of their visible works. In this way, they cultivated a 
charismatic, almost personal relationship with their followers, creating a direct link 
between their constituents and themselves (Lazarte 1991, 600-601). Their actions were 
also clientelist in nature. Most of the votes they garnered were a result of the public 
services they provided.
While both the UCS and Condepa heavily criticized the traditional political party 
system, they ultimately joined forces with it in the 1990s. They gave their implicit 
support to pacted democracy and to the hegemony of the three traditional political parties 
when they joined those parties in two different ruling coalitions (Mayorga, F. 2003, 
108).27 By the end of the decade, however, new political parties had emerged that were 
not supportive of the traditional party leaders nor the political system that sustained them. 
The MAS and the MIP are examples of these “anti-systemic” parties (Gamarra 2003a, 4).
The MAS was established as the political wing of the Six Federations of coca 
growers in the Chapare region. Building Its bases Initially through the defense of the 
cocal ero" s right to cultivate his crop, the MAS’ popularity expanded rapidly at the end of 
the 1990s. This was largely because of the appeal o f its anti-American stance after the
27 Specifically, the UCS formed part o f the Pacto por la Gobernabilidad (1993-1997), under Sánchez de 
Lazada, and both UCS and Condepa joined the ADN in the Compromiso por Bolivia (1997-2002), although 
Condepa would later withdraw from the pact.
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controversial implementation of Plan Dignidad?* Since then the MAS challenged, both 
formally in Congress and informally in the streets, the neoliberal, pro-American stances 
o f the Banzer and second Sánchez de Lozada (2002-2003) administrations. Like 
Palenque and Fernández, Morales has tremendous charismatic appeal and has 
accumulated a lot of political and even financial capital, not just domestically but also at 
the international level (Gamarra 2003a, 18).
The MIP was founded under the leadership of Felipe Quispe in 2000. An 
indigenist party, that is, one that wants to reclaim Bolivia for its original, indigenous 
inhabitants, Quispe’s MIP has called for the creation of a worker/campesino-led 
government (Gamarra 2002, 21). While gaining six seats in the National Congress after
2002, Quispe has actively and vociferously worked against the institutions and principles 
of representative democracy. Indeed, as his dream of a government composed of workers 
and campesinos suggests, Quispe’s vision of democracy is a manifestation of the 
corporatist notions upheld by the COB and the CSUTCB (of which Quispe is also the 
leader). At one point, the MIP leader declared that he was only a part of the lower house 
so that he could work to destroy the system from the inside (Fundación Milenio 2004,
22).
Finally, a third political party to emerge from its Cochabambino stronghold in the 
late 1990s was the Nueva Fuerza Republicana (NFR). Headed by Manfred Reyes Villa,
28 In 1998, President Banzer implemented a US-induced coca eradication plan that wiped out nearly all the 
coca fields in the Chapare. The effects o f the so-called Plan Dignidad were disastrous for the coca 
growers, not only because it dramatically reduced the financial benefits o f coca cultivation, but also 
because it seriously damaged the informal sectors that had developed alongside the country’s coca industry. 
The effects o f Plan Dignidad also unintentionally transformed Morales and the MAS from a local 
phenomenon into a national actor (Gamarra 2004).
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the NFR was transformed from a strong locally-based party29 to a nationally recognized 
one during the 2002 presidential elections, in which Reyes was a serious contender.
While Reyes ultimately lost the presidency in 2002, he did join Sánchez de Lozada’s 
mega-coalition in the latter part of its existence, only to drop out once more before the 
President’s forced resignation in October 2003. As with the MAS and the MIP, the NFR 
has been an active critic of the traditional political parties since that time and has called 
for a general overhaul of the political and economic models adopted in 1985 (Mayorga,
F. 2003, 116).
Unlike Condepa and UCS, the MAS, MIP, and in some periods the NFR, strongly 
opposed the traditional political party system. Yet, their popular appeal was very similar 
to that of Condepa and the UCS: it was based on clientelism and, in the case of the MIP 
and the MAS, corporatist notions of representation. Like Fernández, Reyes Villa 
attracted many followers through his campaign of obras visibles. Quispe channeled the 
demands of the rural and labor sectors as the head of both the MIP and the CSUTCB. 
Morales, who has conformed to the political system much more since his emergence as a 
prominent political figure after Sánchez de Lozada’s fall, began his political ascent as 
head of the prominent coca sector (Mayorga, F. 2003, 117). In all three cases, their 
primary linkages with society were either based on clientelist or corporatist appeals.
And, like UCS and Condepa, the parties each arose out of perceived deficits in the 
traditional political party system.
29 Reyes was the mayor o f Cochabamba -  the third largest city in Bolivia after Santa Cruz and La Paz -  
from 1993-2002.
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These new political parties were not the only actors to emerge In the 1990s as 
direct or Indirect threats to the traditional political parties’ electoral and political 
dominance. Beginning in 2000, other powerful, non-state forces materialized in response 
to and as a result of the changing social landscape in the country. In particular, civil 
society organizations and social movements emerged that began to directly challenge 
policy decisions taken by the state. Defending the rights of the poor urban and rural 
sectors, indigenous peoples, local unions, and other community-based organizations, 
these groups were able to represent sectors of Bolivian society that felt largely 
disconnected from the formal political process. They expressed their discontent primarily 
by reviving the strategy of blockades, protests, and hunger strikes that had in the past 
been used with great success by the COB. This “politics of the street” (Calderón 1982) 
was in large part supported in Congress by the MAS and the MIP. Thus, in many ways, 
the opposition employed a two-prong strategy for resisting the state and what was largely 
perceived as its neoliberal and pro-American stance: “/o que no consigas en el 
parlamento, se consigue en la calle” (Chávez, et al. 2004).
One of these groups formed in response to a sudden spike in the cost of water in 
the city of Cochabamba. In 1998, the regional company that provided water to a majority 
o f the homes in the city was privatized and turned over to the international consortium, 
Aguas del Tunari. The Coordinadora del Agua y  la Vida was formed as a response to 
this privatization with the objective of defending the right of the city’s population to 
water and other basic services (Garcia, et al. 2004, 626). Headed by Oscar Olivera, the 
Coordinadora organized a series of mobilizations, strikes, and even an informal 
referendum condemning Aguas de Tunari after it had announced a 35% increase in the
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cost of water. By April 2000, the contract with Aguas del Tunari was retracted (Garcia, 
et al. 2004, 629). The Guerra del Agua was successful, and the model used by the 
Coordinadora was replicated by other groups during future conflicts in the country 
(Interview A, 4 May 2005; Interview B, 6 May 2005).
Several examples of these conflicts materialized in the latter half of 2000, just on 
the heels o f the Guerra del Agua. In September, coca growers in the Chapare organized a 
series of road blockades, refusing to clear the highways until the government halted their 
coca eradication strategy and their plans to construct a US-financed military base.
Around the same time, the increasingly active teachers unions organized a series of 
protests with both urban and rural teachers. They demanded a salary increase and the 
modification of different aspects of the administration’s education reform. The CSUTCB 
also sparked a round of protests that led to violent confrontations between the group and 
the Bolivian armed forces. As a result o f the conflict, more than a dozen campesinos 
were killed (Gamarra 2002, 13-14).
Each of these incidents reflected the growth of a new set of unified social forces 
that was beginning to threaten the traditional political parties’ hold over political control. 
As one interviewee noted (Interview A, 4 May 2005), whereas these social movements 
were largely incapable o f resolving many of the country’s social, political, and economic 
problems, they were able to bring these issues to light, forcing the government to address 
them. After 2000, this pattern of protest, negotiation, and conflict resolution was 
continuously exploited by different organized sectors of Bolivian society, because, as 
many have noted (Gamarra 2002, Interview A, 4 May 2005), it was far more successful at 
producing results than the severely inefficient political system.
73
Thus, even though the COB had been dismantled by the NPE, the corporatist 
tradition it represented lived on and began to manifest itself in new ways by the end of 
the 1990s. The emergence of political parties like the MAS and the MIP and of social 
movements in defense of the rights of cocaleros, teachers, and rural campesinos reflected 
this revived tradition. The corporatist nature of these groups starkly contrasted with the 
representative nature of the traditional political parties. Whereas the party leaders 
advocated institutional changes for renewing democracy in Bolivia, the emerging social 
leaders advocated the use of mechanisms of direct participation (Calderón and Gamarra
2003, 15). Moreover, the new political parties and social movements appealed to the 
poor urban and rural classes, underscoring the middle class-based nature of the traditional 
political parties’ patrimonial appeal. And the allure of the new parties and movements 
was growing: their successes in confronting the government through the Guerra del Agua 
demonstrated that their popular support had become strong enough to banish a 
multinational from the country.
In effect, by 2000, the strength of these new political actors was on par with that 
of the traditional political parties. The “dichotomy” (Gamarra 2002, 28) of the two 
groups in terms of political power led many to conclude that there existed, by the early 
21st century, dos institucionalidades (two institutionalities, in English) in Bolivia: one, as 
represented by the country’s formal political institutions and particularly the traditional 
political parties and the other corresponding to the país profundo, or the non-state 
political forces harkening back to the formerly organized urban and rural sectors 
(Interview A, 4 May 2005; Gamarra 2002, 14). In many ways* the two institutionalities 
in Bolivia represented a return to the struggle for political power that existed in the
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country prior to the transition to democracy. As In the 1960s and 1970s, the central 
governing authority In Bolivia had been replaced by competing political factions, each 
which their own contrasting definition of what representation should entail. The role of 
the traditional political party system as the sole intermediary between state and society 
was clearly under attack.
Conclusion
By 2000, then, it was evident that the linkages that the traditional political party 
system maintained with society were threatened. The reasons for this were twofold. On 
the one hand, the principle of pacted democracy, while promoting political stability at 
least in the short-term, effectively isolated the political party system from Bolivian 
society. Executive-centric policy-making and implementation diminished the importance 
of political parties and reduced their role to one of job distribution and inter-party 
bargaining. As such, the traditional political parties were hard-pressed to develop 
linkages with society beyond that of clientelist-based neopatrimonialism. Historically 
tied to the urban middle classes, the limitations of this party-society linkage began to 
manifest by the end of the 1990s in the wake of the economic recession. As the number 
o f jobless Bolivians grew, so too did the discontent toward the traditional political 
parties. The emergence of new parties and social movements supports this contention.
Moreover, corporatist notions of representation dating back to the MNR’s dream 
of forging a single-party hegemonic democracy after the National Revolution had never 
died away. The COB represented the notion throughout the 1960s and 1970s. While the 
NPE was able to abolish the Central in 1985, the political parties, constrained as they 
were by the limited extent of patrimonialism, were unable to capture the support of the
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disenfranchised laborers. By the end of the 1990s, new social movements and political 
parties entered onto the political scene, reviving the corporatist tradition and reconnecting 
with the poor urban and rural classes that had been disenfranchised after the dismantling 
of the COB. Their accomplishments both in the streets and at the ballot box imply that 
many Bolivians still responded to these kinds of linkages. Thus, the political parties were 
not only incapacitated by the weaknesses of pacted democracy. They were also 
debilitated by the renewed calls for corporatism by the newly politicized poor urban and 
rural sectors.
As a result, by 2000, the clientelist-based linkages that the traditional political 
parties were able to sustain with society were being tested by growing domestic pressures 
for change. The economic recession, changing social dynamics, and successful non-state 
political mobilizations threatened the dominance of the traditional political party system. 
Its weak, or what one interviewee has called “thin,” linkages with society were 
vulnerable to the convergence of economic, political, and social change in the country 
(Interview A, 4 May 2005). By the beginning of the 21st century, it became increasingly 
apparent that the party system was in danger of decline. Chapter Four argues that the 
traditional political party system did enter into decline after 2000 and looks at the specific 
manifestations of this decline, both prior to the political crisis of 2003 and after Sánchez 
de Lozada’s forced resignation.
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IV. ANALYZING PARTY SYSTEM DECLINE
Chapter Three examined the conditions of economic crisis and social change in 
Bolivia by the end of the 1990s, setting the stage for traditional political party system 
decline. The purpose of this chapter is to make the case that the traditional party system 
actually entered into decline after 2000 and examines how that decline has been 
expressed since then. To do this, it focuses on four different manifestations of the 
erosion of the clientelist-based party-society linkages in Bolivia.
The first section looks at the electoral expressions of the traditional party system 
decline. It notes a gradual decline in voter abstention and an increase in electoral 
volatility by the end of the decade. The 2002 presidential elections are a further 
indication of the discontent toward the traditional political parties: while the MNR was 
able to win the presidency, its win was by the narrowest of margins. Overall, the loss in 
voter share of the three traditional political parties in 2002 was profound. Moreover, the 
legislative shake-up after the elections produced a Congress that was bitterly divided 
along traditional-new political party lines, complicating executive-legislative relations 
and weakening the traditional political parties vis-a-vis the opposition in Parliament.
Bolivian opinion on the traditional political parties between 1998 and 2004 
represents the second manifestation of the decline of the party system. The second 
section of the chapter analyzes the wealth of information produced by two sets o f surveys 
and focus groups carried out in Bolivia between 1998 and 2004. Notably, confidence in 
political parties, and the traditional political parties in general, was low in 1998 and had 
decreased even further by 2004. Four years into the 21st century, most Bolivians felt that 
political parties were not necessary for democracy, nor was the principle of pacted
77
democracy that underscored their democratic regime. Finally, Bolivians reserved their 
most negative opinions for the traditional political parties. Whereas some of the newer 
political parties, including the MAS, were viewed in a more positive light, by 2004, it 
was clear that the traditional political parties had lost the confidence of society. These 
expressions of discontent serve as another indicator of the decline of the traditional 
political party system.
The third section delves briefly into a new phenomenon that has emerged since 
Sánchez de Lozada’s forced resignation in 2003. Specifically, it looks at the surfacing of 
“anti-party” policies after his downfall, including the use of referenda for important 
policymaking decisions, the call for a Constituent Assembly, and a law that allows non­
political party candidates to run for office. The presumption underlying this section is 
that such policies would not have been passed if not for the overwhelming rejection of 
the traditional political parties after 2000. The erosion of the linkages between the 
traditional parties and society was reflected in the replacement of those political parties 
with other electoral and policymaking alternatives.
Finally, given the “anti-party” political context after the fall of Sánchez de 
Lozada, the last section examines the results from the first electoral race to take place 
after the political crisis of that year. As might be expected, the traditional political parties 
fared very poorly in the December 2004 municipal elections. On the other hand, new 
political parties, and particularly the MAS, were much more successful at the local level. 
This last section, then, looks at the decline of the traditional political party system while 
also highlighting the possible transformation of party politics from a system centered on 
the three traditional political parties to one that comprises the newer political parties.
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Examining the Electoral Evidence o f  Party System Decline
Some scholars have argued that the first two signs of dealignment in a country are 
electoral volatility and voter abstention (Hagopian 1998). These electoral trends indicate 
the “rising tide of citizen disinterest, disillusion, and disaffection” toward their political 
parties and the political system in general (Hagopian 1998, 118). They are, in essence, 
good snapshot measures of the state of the linkages between political parties and society. 
In the case of Bolivia, because the political system was ruled by the alternation of power 
between the MNR, MIR, and ADN, any surge in electoral volatility or decline in voter 
abstention after 1985 can be attributed in large part to the “disinterest, disillusion, and 
disaffection” towards these three traditional political parties. This assumption underlies 
the analysis to follow.
Voter abstention intensified by the end of the 1990s and particularly during the 
2002 presidential elections. The percentage of registered voters who abstained from 
voting grew consistently during the decade. In 1993, 18.34% of registered voters 
abstained. By 1997, this figure had risen to 22.46%, and in the presidential elections of 
2002, the abstention percentage topped out at 24.8% (Mayorga, R. 2002, 96).30 Electoral 
volatility also increased between the 1997 and 2002 elections, although it had been high 
since the second democratic election in 1985. While the volatility level31 was 46.19 after 
the 1997 election, it rose to 50.27 in 2002 (Political Database of the Americas, 1999, 
2000a, 2000b), suggesting a rather dramatic shift in voter shares between the two
30 These figures represent the total number of registered voters who abstained as a percentage o f the total 
population who is eligible to vote (that is, over 18 years o f age) but is not necessarily registered to vote.
31 The volatility levels are according to the Pedersen’s Index. For each o f the three elections (1993, 1997, 
2002), the top eight voter share percentages were used. The author compiled the data and determined the 
volatility level using the Political Database o f the Americas (2000a, 2000b, 2002).
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elections. Indeed, a closer look at the 2002 national election is merited, as the high 
electoral volatility represented primarily a turn from the traditional political parties to 
three newer parties, the MAS, the NFR, and the MIP.
The traditional political parties did not fare well in the 2002 national election, 
particularly in comparison with past years. Prior to 2002, the three traditional political 
parties taken together captured the majority of the votes in each election. Table 4.1 in 
Appendix 2 compares the voter share, as a percentage of total votes, of the MNR, ADN, 
and MIR (labeled “Traditional”) in each national election since 1989 with the voter share 
of the next three top placers in each election (labeled “Next Three”). In 1989, for 
example, the MNR, ADN, and MIR together won 65.41% of the total popular vote, 
whereas the three parties that placed fourth, fifth, and sixth in terms of voter share, in this 
case, Condepa, Izquierda Unida (IU), and Partido Socialista-1 (PS-1), captured only 
20.76%. By 2002, the three traditional political parties together received only 42.16% of 
the voter share and were no longer the top three finishers. The MAS, MIP, and the NFR, 
on the other hand, received 47.94% of the vote. For the first time, three non-traditional 
political parties captured a larger percentage of the voter share than the traditional parties.
The impact of this shift in voter shares was dramatic. For one, the ADN virtually 
disappeared from the national stage, and the MIR finished in fourth place behind two new 
political parties, the NFR and the MAS, as well as the MNR. For its part, the MNR 
managed to receive the highest number of votes, but it did so with only a very slight 
plurality.32 New political parties, on the other hand, did surprisingly well: the MAS
32 On June 30, 2002, official first round election results, as taken from the Comité Nacional Electoral of 
Bolivia, were the following at the national level: MNR, 22.46%; MAS, 20.94%; NFR, 20.91%; MIR,
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placed a close second behind the MNR, the NFR received the third highest percentage of 
votes, and the MIP ended in fifth place after the MIR. The 2002 results suggest, at least 
electorally speaking, that the traditional political parties no longer dominated the political 
system as they had for the past fifteen years,33
The MAS and the MIP were two of the clear winners in 2002; together they 
accounted for almost 30% of the Congress, giving them the power to veto when voting as 
a bloc. In particular, the MIP won five seats in the lower house, and the MAS won 
thirteen. Beyond their electoral triumph, the symbolic victory of the MAS and the MIP 
was also important. Representing in many ways the demands of the social movements 
that had dominated the streets after 2000, their congressional victory meant that, for the 
first time, these informal political forces would have an institutional voice in government. 
The political society in Bolivia, as defined by the three traditional political parties, had 
converged with the country’s proactive civil society in the Congress (Mayorga, F. 2002, 
141). Despite this unprecedented opportunity for cross-party collaboration, however, the 
Congress split down traditional/new party lines. The MNR formed an uneasy pact with 
the MIR and UCS, and the NFR, MAS, and MIP would serve as a forceful and dominant 
opposition in the legislature.
Indeed, the antagonistic nature of President Sánchez de Lozada’s Pacto Plan
Bolivia cannot be overstated. The hostile relationship between the MNR and the MIR
16.31%; MIP, 6.09%; UCS, 5.51%; ADN, 3.39%; LyJ, 2.72%; PS, 0.65%; MCC, 0.63%; CONDEPA, 
0.37%.
33 Another author has taken a different spin on the 2002 national elections. Considering the poor electoral 
results o f the MNR, MIR, and ADN, he argues that traditional political party system was in fact quite 
resilient after 2002. By forming an alliance between the MNR and the MIR, the principle o f coalitions was 
preserved; the party system converted from a tripod of three parties to a vertical column consisting o f two 
(Mayorga, R. 2002, 78). This study suggests that his analysis is overly optimistic given the polarized nature 
o f politics that resulted from the MNR-MIR alliance, the character o f which is discussed below.
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distracted the coalition from dealing with the growing economic and social problems in 
the country. Moreover, it exacerbated the patronage-driven nature of the pact: the two 
principal parties fought for every Ministry, Embassy, and any other governmental job 
available. Some argued that it was more patronage-based than any other coalition before 
it (Gamarra 2003b, 290). Although the hegemony of the traditional political parties 
prevailed, then, past guarantees of govemability and political stability were no longer 
assured. A vociferous, opposition-led Congress fostered this instability.
The shift in votes from the traditional to the new political parties in the 2002 
national election reflected a dealignment of the traditional parties with society. An 
increase in voter abstention, which had reached its height in 2002, along with the high 
electoral volatility compared to 1997, support this contention. Moreover, even though 
the MNR and the MIR managed to form a Congressional coalition in which traditional 
political party control was maintained, the antagonistic and tenuous nature of the pact 
reflected the extent to which their dominance had been debilitated. As one author argues, 
it appeared, in 2002, that pacted democracy had “run its course” (Gamarra 2003b, 290). 
Assessing Bolivian Opinion on the Traditional Political Party System
It could be argued that the 2002 presidential election results were an electoral 
anomaly and a short-term reaction to the aggravated economic and social context in 
which they were carried out. Other indicators measured from 1998 on, however, suggest 
that the relative losses of the MNR, ADN, and MIR were instead a manifestation of an 
intensified discontent toward the traditional political parties, the Congress, and even the 
President during that time. In particular, by 2004, Bolivian opinion towards the
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traditional political parties and the political system in general had dropped to very low 
levels. The following pages look at different expressions of this discontent.
Most of the survey data below refer to “political parties” as a group and not 
specifically to the three traditional political parties (MNR, MIR, ADN) that are the focus 
of this study. That said, an assumption of the proceeding analysis is that most of the 
discontent measured in the surveys was directed in particular to the three traditional 
political parties. There are two reasons for this. One, as the study has already 
demonstrated, the three traditional political parties dominated the party system from 1985 
on. Thus, most of the anger toward the party system was in fact directed to these three 
parties and not to “political parties” as a group. The unexpected electoral success of the 
new political parties, including the MAS and the MIP, in 2002 and 2004 (to be discussed 
below), support this contention.
Moreover, most of the anti-party discourse elaborated by the social movements 
and new political parties after 1998 was directed explicitly at these three parties. Thus, it 
seems reasonable to expect that the traditional political parties would have been conflated 
with the political party system in general within these surveys, although there is no 
evidence that definitively supports this supposition. Nevertheless, the last part of this 
section is dedicated to survey results (Appendix 4, Table 4.6) that actually differentiate 
between the confidence levels of different political parties. The lowest levels are 
reserved for the three traditional political parties -  a fact that supports the assumption that 
underlies the following pages.
Between 1998 and 2004, then, a representative sample of Bolivians was asked to 
respond to a series of questions about different political institutions in the country. The
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group had to specify how much confidence they had in political parties, Congress, the 
President, and the municipal government, among others. Given a scale of 1 to 7, the 
respondents would choose 1 if they had no confidence at all in the institution and 7 if 
they had a lot of confidence. Appendix 3 provides the results for each of the questions in 
the four survey periods. In the four tables, the black bar represents an aggregate of the 
two lowest ratings, that is, the sum of the percentage of respondents who had no 
confidence in each institution (a rating of 1) and the percentage of respondents who gave
2 as their answer on the 1 to 7 scale. Accordingly, the white bar is an aggregate of the 
percentage o f respondents who gave the two highest ratings possible on the seven-point 
scale.
As expected, the overall confidence is lowest and the most pronounced in the case 
of the political parties. Notably, the highest confidence towards political parties 
accounted for only 5.7% of the total respondents surveyed in 2002. This jump from the 
much lower “highest” ratings in 1998, 2000, and 2004 may be a result of the presidential 
elections of that year. While highly unpopular, Sánchez de Lozada did represent a 
change from the Banzer/Quiroga administration, whose popularity had suffered greatly 
after the Guerra del Agua and throughout the rest of their term, when the number of 
protests, blockades, and governmental stand-offs escalated in the country.
Overall, however, the political parties fared poorly in each of the four survey 
periods. At their best, in 1998, the percentage of respondents who had the lowest levels 
of confidence in the political parties was just under 50% of the total population sample. 
The most pronounced differences in levels of confidence were recorded in 2000 and 
2004, when the “lowest” percentage reached almost 60% of the sample. In general, the
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differences between the highest and lowest levels of confidence towards the political 
parties increased between 1998 and 2004, although these increases were not uniform.
The 2000 sample is notable because it registered a spike in the lowest confidence 
ratings for three o f the four institutions listed: political parties, the President, and the 
Congress, although to a lesser degree. This suggests that the effects of the economic 
recession and growing social unrest after 1998 were exacerbating the already poor 
confidence levels of each of these institutions. As such, these results contradict the 
argument that the 2002 elections were simply an anomaly. Discontent, as registered in 
terms of voter abstention, electoral volatility, and low levels of institutional confidence, 
had existed in the years prior to the presidential elections in 2002.
What is perhaps most surprising from the 2000 data set is that the municipal 
governments did not register a similar spike in lowest confidence ratings as the other 
institutions. Instead, the difference between the highest and lowest confidence ratings 
stayed almost constant during the seven years of the survey set, suggesting that, while the 
municipalities did not earn greater levels of trust among Bolivians, they did not lose their 
confidence either. The relative stability of confidence levels for municipal governments 
with respect to political parties, Congress, and the President, suggest that Bolivians may 
be more satisfied with governance at the local versus the national level.
Admittedly, the time period covered in these tables is rather short. Data on 
attitudes towards the political parties in Bolivia prior to 1998 would have strengthened 
the conclusions drawn here about their progressive decline during subsequent years, 
when data was available. The tables do, however, provide an initial glimpse of the 
confidence among Bolivians towards their institutions during the height of the era of
85
pacted democracy and before the political party system began to decline. Indeed, in 
1998, the economic and social impact of the recession had yet to be felt in its entirety. 
Still, as expected, two years later the recession’s effects had exacerbated the low levels of 
confidence of many Bolivians towards their political institutions, especially at the 
national level
In 2004, Bolivia’s National Electoral Court (CNE in Spanish) carried out another 
round of surveys and focus groups in an attempt to capture Bolivians’ attitudes towards 
political parties, other political actors, and with regards to democracy in general, just one 
year after the 2003 political crisis and Sánchez de Lozada’s forced resignation. The 
initial results from this project provide additional support to the argument that the 
political party system is in a state of decline. Appendix 4 contains a series of different 
tables indicating the opinion of Bolivians on the importance of political parties and other 
political institutions. As the following analysis suggests, attitudes towards political 
parties and the political party system in 2004 were decisively low.
Table 4.2, for example, represents the responses given to the question of whether 
political parties are necessary for democracy. As the results indicate, almost 81% of the 
respondents felt that political parties are considered only somewhat or not at all necessary 
for democracy in the country. Indeed, whereas only 15.4% of those surveyed believed 
that parties were very necessary for democracy, 24.3% thought that they were not at all 
necessary. The most common response for this question was that political parties were 
only somewhat necessary for democracy. This attitude clearly contradicts the theoretical 
notion that political parties are fundamental for representative democracy. It also implies
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that, while democracy is still supported in the country, the political party system in 
Bolivia is no longer considered an important aspect of that regime.
It was not just the political parties that were no longer considered fundamental for 
democracy in Bolivia. The principle of pacted democracy that has sustained the party 
system since 1985 was also questioned by the respondents in the 2004 survey. As Table 
4.3 indicates, most Bolivians do not believe that party alliances are valuable. Of those 
surveyed, 76.4 percent felt that there were better forms of government that did not rely 
upon Congressional pacts. Only 16 percent felt that the parties should continue to form 
alliances in Parliament, suggesting that the notion of pacted democracy, at least in terms 
of Bolivian opinion, had, in fact, “run its course.”
The CNE 2004 survey also asked Bolivians to evaluate a list of nineteen different 
institutions in terms of their contributions to democracy; how well they work; if they are 
trustworthy; if they are corrupt; or whether they should be eliminated altogether, if  given 
the choice. From this set of five questions, the CNE developed two measures that 
ordered the nineteen institutions in terms of how positively or how negatively they were 
perceived.34 The results from this question set are important because, unlike the Seligson 
data above, they include not only the confidence level of each institution, but they also 
evaluate how well the institution is perceived to be working and how much it has 
contributed to democracy (CNE 2004, 76). Tables 4.4 and 4.5 provide the results for the 
two measures. The institutions with the most positive image, as denoted in Table 4.4,
34 In the survey, respondents were asked to identify, from the list o f nineteen institutions plus an option for 
none o f the above, which o f the set o f institutions they perceived as (1) contributing the most to democracy; 
(2) working the best; (3) the most corrupt; (4) having the most confidence; and (5) worthy o f elimination. 
The first, second, and fourth options contributed to the positive image of an institution. The third and fifth 
options contributed to its overall negative image. The scores for each institution were then tallied. 
Percentages were determined according to those results and based on a total o f 300 percentage points.
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include the Catholic Church, the mayors, the Ombudsman, the press, and Civic 
Committees. Notably, political parties only score above the Armed Forces and 
transnational companies in terms of their positive image.
As with the Seligson data on institutional confidence between 1998 and 2004, 
Table 4,5 indicates that the political parties have by far the most negative image of all 
nineteen institutions. Parliament comes in a distant second. In general, most of the 
national political institutions, that is, political parties, Parliament, government, as well as 
the police and the Armed Forces, maintain a very low positive image, particularly in 
comparison with local or community-based institutions. Civic committees, the Mayor, 
and neighborhood juntas, on the other hand, receive a relatively high ranking in terms of 
their positive image. Here, as with the Seligson data, there is a difference in the 
assessment of the work and democratic contributions of local level political and 
community-based institutions versus their national counterparts. It appears that Bolivians 
are, in general, more satisfied with their local institutions than they are with those at the 
national level.
It is important to make a distinction between the traditional political parties of the 
country’s party system from the new political parties that emerged during and after the 
1990s. Another aspect of the survey suggests that Bolivians have differing opinions 
about the traditional versus the newer political parties. Given a list of eight different 
political parties, those surveyed had to state whether they had a favorable or unfavorable 
opinion of each. Table 4.6 indicates the responses for the MNR, MIR, MAS, Movimiento 
sin Miedo (MSM), ADN, UCS, MIP, NFR, and Unidad Nacional (UN). The results 
listed represent the subtraction of the percentage who responded unfavorably to those
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who responded favorably. As the table demonstrates, all of the political parties have an 
unfavorable image. Three of the least favorable percentages, however, can be attributed 
to the three traditional political parties: the MIR has an aggregate image of -65%; the 
MNR, -66%; and the ADN, -76%. The MIP and the UCS also have comparably low 
ratings, reflecting the polarizing nature of the former (as well as its limited electoral reach 
over the long term) and the ephemerality of the latter, particularly after the death of its 
leader.
Notably, the parties that register the most favorable image relative to the 
traditional political parties are all new, having only emerged in the past five to ten years. 
The MAS clearly fares best, with a -30% overall rating. Morales’ political party, along 
with the UN and the MSM,35 each received an overall negative rating that was under 50 
percent. These numbers lend additional support to the possibility that the 2002 
presidential election results were not just an anomaly. The image of the traditional 
political parties is very low, particularly in comparison with other political parties. In 
2002, their unfavorable image was reflected in their unusually low share of the total 
votes; in 2004, this attitude has clearly been sustained. On the other hand, the newer 
parties have a much more favorable image, suggesting that may serve as a more attractive 
electoral option in the future.
35 The Frente Unidad Nacional (UN) is a political party founded in Cochabamba on December 12,2003, 
by a former MIR member, Samuel Doria Medina. Doria was subsequently elected as the head of the party 
on April 4, 2004 (Fundación Milenio 2004, 23). A successful businessman and one of the richest people in 
Bolivia, Doria’s reputation as a political outsider has helped him to become a strong contender for the 2007 
presidential elections. Movimiento sin Miedo (MSM) was founded in 1999 by another former MIR 
member, luae del Granado. Currently the reelected mayor o f La Paz, the party is strongest in this political 
capital. Like Condepa or the UCS of the 1990s, the MSM has been successful because o f del Granado’s 
ability to carry out obras visibles in the city (Gamarra 2005, 13). Del Granado’s potential presidential 
candidacy may be hampered by the party’s inability to extend its electoral reach beyond the department of 
La Paz.
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Overall, the results from the CNE survey indicate that most Bolivians were 
disillusioned and unhappy with the traditional political parties and the party system in 
2004, While none of the political parties were perceived in an overly positive light, the 
traditional political parties were the most maligned of all. Moreover, a majority no 
longer believed that political parties or their coalitions were necessary for democracy. As 
such, the CNE survey results lends support to the contention that the weak links that the 
traditional political parties once had society were eroded, particularly in the year 
following the 2003 political crisis.
Anti-Party Politics after 2003
Another aspect of the decline of the traditional political parties was the 
conspicuous absence of those parties in terms of the promises made and the laws 
implemented since the fall of Sánchez de Lozada. Indeed, the new, ‘partyless’ president, 
Carlos Mesa Gilbert, assumed office without the formal backing of any political party, 
promising to dedicate his term to the fulfillment of three lofty objectives: to carry out a 
binding referendum on the exportation of the country’s hydrocarbons; to modify the 
existing Hydrocarbons Law according to the referendum; and to organize a Constituent 
Assembly to reform Bolivia’s constitution. The goals of his “October Agenda,” along 
with a law passed in 2004 that allows other citizen and indigenous groups to put forth 
candidates for election alongside political parties, represented a new trend in policy­
making after the 2003 political crisis. They reflected a move away from party-based 
governance and the traditional political party system that had been central to 
representative democracy in country since 1985.
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One fundamental element of Mesa’s “October Agenda” was his pledge to 
organize a referendum on the Hydrocarbons Law. This referendum, which was carried 
out on July 18, 2004, bypassed the political parties in Congress and brought the issue of if 
and how to export Bolivia’s natural gas reserves directly to Bolivians for them to decide. 
In essence, the referendum was promoted and even celebrated as a mechanism of direct 
citizen participation. The information drive carried out by the government prior to its 
realization heralded the referendum as an expression of direct democracy.36 Mesa’s 
campaign worked. Each of the five points of the referendum was eventually approved, 
although as of the time of writing an interpretation of the referendum results had yet to be 
formulated that could be successfully translated into law.37
The other important goal of Mesa’s agenda was the organization of a Constituent 
Assembly. Calls for sweeping constitutional reform had been made continuously by 
many different groups, including the MAS, the CSUTCB, the Coordinadora del Agua, 
the teachers’ unions, and student movements, since the politically tumultuous year of 
2000. As the discontent toward the political party system grew after that time, so too did 
the calls for a Constituent Assembly. The Assembly, while not explicitly undermining 
the role of political parties as in the case of the hydrocarbons referendum, did threaten to 
undermine their dominance. Indeed, many supporters of the Assembly called for the
36 The author was in La Paz and Cochabamba in June 2004, only a few weeks prior to the referendum vote. 
Propaganda about the vote, in the form o f pamphlets, posters, and even street-wide banners in both cities 
marketed the referendum to citizens by portraying it as a mechanism of “democracia directa” ,
37 The length o f each o f the five questions, as well as their highly technical nature, has led the many critics 
o f the referendum to conclude that, even though the referendum was overwhelmingly approved, the content 
o f each question is so ambiguous that different sectors have entirely different interpretations of what that 
approval means. As a result, by June 2005 the language of the new Hydrocarbons Law had not yet been 
approved in both houses o f Congress and by the President, In early May 2005, Congress was able to agree 
upon a draft Law. Ultimately, however, Mesa demurred from rejecting or passing the Law, and it was sent 
back to Congress for further consideration.
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abolishment of the traditional political parties as a condition of its organization (Gamarra 
2002, 13).
In early July 2004, just weeks before the hydrocarbons referendum, another piece 
of important legislation passed that altered the electoral landscape and the notion of 
representation in Bolivia. The Ley de Agrupaciones Ciudadanas y  Pueblos Indígenas 
(henceforth referred to as the Ley) allowed citizens to run for office outside of political 
party structures through agrupaciones ciudadanas (citizen groups) or pueblos indígenas 
(indigenous groups). The goals of the Ley included the ureconfiguración del sistema 
político y  la puesta en escena de nuevos mecanismos de representación popular” (Rocha 
2004). In essence, the Ley was passed as a mechanism to eliminate the monopoly of the 
political parties as the sole channel of representation of citizens in government. Mesa 
himself proclaimed that the Ley represented Aparte del camino hacia la participación de 
la ciudadanía” (Los Tiempos 8 July 2004). The Ley provided an innovative way for 
citizens to participate in politics without having to go through political party structures.
The hydrocarbons referendum, the proposed Constituent Assembly, and the Ley 
de Agrupaciones Ciudadanas y  Pueblos Indígenas were each promoted by the Mesa 
administration as opportunities for the direct participation of citizens in the democratic 
process. In each case, the hegemonic nature of the traditional political party system was 
directly or indirectly jeopardized. The referendum took the policy-making process from 
Congress and gave it to the population at large. The Ley allowed for non-party 
candidates to compete with political party members for elected positions. The 
Constituent Assembly threatened to change the nature of the political system completely. 
The desire among many Bolivians for each of these acts, and the willingness of the Mesa
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administration to attempt to carry them out, were another reflection of the traditional 
political party system’s decline in the country.
Indeed, it is reasonable to infer that, if the traditional political parties had not 
become dealigned with society, citizen demands to essentially replace them with citizen 
or indigenous groups or to bypass them altogether with policymaking referenda would 
not have materialized. Unhappy with the traditional political parties’ political 
performance between 1985 and 2003, Bolivians sought and supported legislation after 
that period that promoted new forms of participation and representation. As with the 
growing voter abstention rates and electoral volatility in 2002 and the survey results 
between 1998 and 2004 by both Seligson and the CNE, the post-2003 political 
developments in Bolivia reflected the severe nature of the dealignment and decline of the 
country’s traditional political party system.
Assessing the Post-Political Crisis Vote
It is important to mention one more event in Bolivia, because in many ways it 
represented the culmination of the decline of the political party system after 2000 and 
since Sánchez de Lozada’s downfall. On December 5, 2004, municipal elections were 
held in the country. These elections marked the first instance in which the Ley was put 
into practice and thus the first instance in which non-party candidates could compete with 
political parties for Municipal Council positions and the mayor’s seat. On that day, 345 
citizen groups, 59 indigenous groups, 17 political parties, and 2 political alliances were 
on the ballot. The results from the municipal elections are illuminating. Whereas the
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indigenous and citizen groups fared quite poorly,38 the new political parties, and the MAS 
in particular, were the clear electoral winners. The MAS obtained 453 council seats 
nationwide; its closest competitor was the MNR with 196 council seats. Despite its 
second place finish, the MNR, along with the MIR and the ADN, did not do well 
comparatively. Together the three parties garnered a mere 16.29 percent of the total vote 
share. The MNR essentially disappeared from the urban centers, and the ADN captured 
only 2.55 percent of the total number of votes (Gamarra 2005, 12).
On the other hand, the new political parties were as successful if  not more so than 
the three traditional political parties. The MAS, as mentioned above, won the most 
council seats, although it did not win any mayoral seats in Bolivia’s ten principle urban
3 9centers. It also demonstrated the broadest national voter spread of any political party or 
citizen group. Other new parties, however, also did quite well. The MSM, Plan 
Progreso (PP), and the UN each received between five and ten percent of the total vote 
share (8.74%, 6.58%, and 5.89% respectively), which, when taken together, exceeds the 
total percentage of votes of the traditional political parties. As one author noted, the 
success of these leaders reflected a conservative calculation on the part of voters to 
reward those mayors who had performed obras visibles in the past (Gamarra 2005, 13).
38 In fact, some indigenous groups were successful at gaining council seats and in a few cases the Mayor’s 
position in small rural municipalities. While citizens groups won council seats and a few key Mayoral 
positions in the urban centers, in most cases these groups provided little more than organizational support 
to former political party members that had abandoned their party in the hopes of finding electoral victory 
on their own. See the National Electoral Court’s web site for the official results from the elections: 
http://www.cne.org.bo.
39 That is, the nine departmental capitals -  Cobija, Cochabamba, La Paz, Oruro, Potosí, Santa Cruz, Sucre, 
Tarija, Trinidad -  and El Alto. While not obtaining any mayoral seats, the MAS did win council seats in 
seven o f the ten principle cities, including four in Cochabamba, three in La Paz, two in El Alto, and one 
council seat each in Sucre, Oruro, Santa Cruz, and Tarija.
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These newer political parties met their citizens’ demands and were subsequently 
rewarded for their work.
Overall, the results from the 2004 Municipal Elections are noteworthy for two 
reasons. On the one hand, they reflect a further decline of the traditional political party 
system in both principle and practice. The presence of a large quantity of indigenous and 
citizen groups implied that many Bolivians sought representation (albeit for the most part 
unsuccessfully) through groups other than political parties. In practice, they 
demonstrated that new political parties were preferred over the traditional ones, at least at 
the local level. Moreover, the elections demonstrated that Bolivians could and did 
differentiate between the traditional and new political parties. Indeed, while the 
traditional political party system fared poorly in the Municipal Elections, the rejection of 
political parties in general was not at all evident. These findings support the CNE 2004 
Survey results, which indicated that the new political parties had a far less negative image 
in comparison with their traditional counterparts.
Thus, it is important to discriminate between the decline of the traditional political 
party system and the endurance of the notion of political parties in general in Bolivia. 
That is, despite post-2003 trends in the country towards downplaying the role of political 
parties, it is clear that most Bolivians recognize that, at least at the local level, certain 
political parties and their leaders have been successful in meeting the needs of their 
constituents. The traditional political party system, on the other hand, has clearly been in 
a state of decline since 2000. The results from the 2004 Municipal Elections support this 
assessment. While the traditional political parties have not dropped out entirely from the
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local or national electoral scene in Bolivia, it is clear that they are no longer in control of 
the country’s political system, as they once were.
Conclusion
The case of Bolivia supports Roberts’ contention that a political party system is in 
decline when it becomes detached from its social moorings. After 2000, the dealignment 
and hence decline of the traditional political party system in Bolivia materialized in four 
different ways: electorally, through the opinions of Bolivians, with the surge in “anti­
party” initiatives, and in the 2004 Municipal Elections. In each instance, the detachment 
of the traditional political parties from society, as well as the discontent of Bolivians 
towards those parties, was evident.
Specifically, survey results from 1998 on suggest that this discontent toward the 
traditional political party system had been strong since the end of the 1990s. By 2004, 
neither the traditional parties nor the principle of pacted democracy had the support of 
most Bolivians. Moreover, after the forced resignation of Sánchez de Lozada, the surge 
in “anti-party” policy initiatives reflected a shift in societal demands to more direct forms 
o f democratic participation. The use of referenda and the adoption of a law that allowed 
non-party candidates to run for office are examples of this. Unhappy with the traditional 
political parties, many different sectors began to search for new forms of representation 
in the country.
The most pronounced evidence of this search for new forms of representation was 
manifested in the shifts in voter shares both in the 2002 and 2004 elections. In 2002, 
more Bolivians supported non-traditional political parties than ever before, and the 
legislative shake-up that ensued fostered a weak traditional party-led ruling coalition
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against a strong Congressional opposition. The 2004 Municipal Elections suggest that 
new linkages with society may be materializing with the new political parties, including, 
in particular, the MAS. In both instances, the new political parties emerged as the 
preferred electoral option for many Bolivians.
As discussed in Chapter Three, the 2002 and 2004 election results demonstrated 
that the clientelist-based patrimonial linkages fostered by the traditional political parties 
were no longer sufficient to capture votes either at the local or national level, reflecting 
those parties’ inability to adapt to shifting societal demands, as represented by the newly 
politicized urban poor and rural classes. The new political parties, on the other hand, 
were successful in appealing to these sectors along more corporatist lines. This shift in 
voter shares, along with the negative Bolivian opinion towards the traditional political 
parties and the emergence of “anti-party” initiatives after 2003, reflected the limitations 
of the ties that bonded the traditional parties to society. The middle class focus of their 
patrimonial-based linkages would prove insufficient as the urban poor and rural classes 
began to articulate their demands by the end of the 1990s.
Thus, it seems clear that the traditional political party system in Bolivia entered in 
decline after the turn o f the millennium, as the preceding pages have demonstrated. Yet, 
it is important to distinguish between party system decline and party system decay in the 
Bolivian case. Although the traditional political party system has become dealigned with 
society, it is still too early to conclude that political parties are no longer capable of 
establishing new linkages with society. The next few years in Bolivia, then, will be 
fundamental for the fate o f the country’s political party system. They will ultimately
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determine whether the country’s traditional political parties are able to forge new 
connections with society or whether they will fall into eventual decay.
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¥ . CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
“Un pensador italiano decía: 'lo viejo se resiste a morir y  lo nuevo no ha nacido [En Bolivia,] estamos en 
una transición dificiF  - José Ortiz Mercado (El Nuevo Día, 1 June 2003).
In 1985» the leaders of the MNR and the ADN sat down together in an effort to 
address the political instability and economic crisis that had plagued the country since the 
tortuous transition to democracy began in the late 1970s. Because of their meeting, the 
country’s political system would be dramatically changed. As the preceding analysis has 
demonstrated, the principle of pacted democracy and the NPE would bring both stability 
and instability to Bolivia. Relief from the economic crisis and the recentralization of 
power into the state allowed the ruling coalitions to govern, shepherding in a decade of 
economic, political, and social reforms.
The political system adopted in 1985 proved to be a doubled-edge sword, 
however. For, whereas the NPE was successful in dismantling the COB and hence 
diminishing their corporatist-based bonds with different sectors of society, the traditional 
political party system, constrained by the limitations of pacted democracy, was ultimately 
unable to capture the support of these sectors. The clientelist-based patrimonial linkages 
they did maintain with society were too weak and too narrow to appease or encapsulate 
the growing needs of the population, particularly by the end of the 1990s. Nevertheless, 
the traditional political party system endured at the base of the country’s hegemonic 
center for more than five presidential terms, sustained by the promise and potential of 
their innovative reforms.
As Roberts theorized, with the arrival of an economic recession in 1998 and with 
it a period of profound social change, the linkages between the traditional political parties
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and society began to erode. The subsequent evidence of party system decline was 
manifested in myriad ways: at the ballot box, with the post-2003 “anti-party” political 
initiatives, and as represented through the opinions and perspectives of Bolivians 
themselves. By the middle of 2005, it was apparent that the traditional political party 
system was in a period of extended decline. They no longer had control of the political 
and economic system that they had helped to create.
Given Bolivia’s political history, as examined in Chapter Two, it is perhaps not 
surprising that the traditional political parties were unable to forge stronger linkages with 
society. After all, political parties and the political party system are relatively alien 
concepts for Bolivians. Accustomed to corporatist notions of political organization, the 
arrival of political parties as the sole mediator between state and society was something 
new in Bolivian politics. Historically speaking, political parties were unable to serve this 
primary intermediating role in the country, particularly with respect to the COB and the 
military. As a result, since 1985, the conceptual difference between political parties and 
social movements was never really articulated. The MAS is an example of the 
ambiguous roles of political actors in the modern-day representative system. Neither 
entirely political party nor social movement, the MAS has been able to exploit both roles 
depending on the circumstances. Notably, the MAS is considered the most popular and 
most powerful political party in the country today.
Thus, despite the remarkable accomplishments of pacted democracy and the NPE, 
Bolivia’s present-day political system has retained many political behaviors that 
contradict the notion of representative democracy. After 2000, the atomization of power 
and loss of centralized political control, along with the ongoing economic crisis,
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essentially reflected a revival of the country’s politically charged past. Roberts would 
argue that this tumultuous period represents the critical moment in which the country’s 
traditional political parties must adapt to the shifting societal demands in an effort to 
realign itself with society and recover their position as the sole channel of mediation 
between state and society. Given the climate of political instability and insecurity in 
Bolivia, the conditions for party-society realignment seem less than optimal. Yet, the 
foundation of a political party system based on new linkages with society is not 
impossible.
Indeed, the question to ask in the coming months and years is not i f  the Bolivian 
political party system will be able to forge new linkages with society. Rather, the 
pending issues are which linkages should be formed in Bolivia and how those linkages 
will be established so that they can endure in the long term. With these questions in 
mind, this study raises two issues that can contribute to Roberts’ theory on party-society 
linkages. Regarding the question of which party-society linkages to establish, Roberts 
makes no normative claims about the five types of linkages that he identifies as 
connecting different Latin American political party systems with their respective 
societies. Clientelism is no “better” and no “worse” than marketing or corporatist-based 
linkages in his framework. Instead, Roberts’ analysis focuses on the particular historical 
context in which the different linkages tend to emerge and decline.
Yet, the Bolivian case examined here suggests that the clientelist-based 
neopatrimonial linkages that connected the traditional political parties with society were 
not sufficient for accommodating the growing demands of the newly mobilized urban 
poor and rural sectors. The highly limited and weak nature of clientelism in Bolivia
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indicates that this linkage is ill-suited to endure sustained economic recession and social 
and political crises, particularly in a country where the democratization process is still 
highly unstable. Thus, in an effort to extend Roberts’ party-society framework and 
deepen our overall understanding of Latin American political party systems, it may be 
useful to consider which linkages might best foster the connection between political 
parties and society in countries like Bolivia.
Additionally, it seems important to begin to consider how the linkages between 
political parties and society can be established initially and then sustained during periods 
of prolonged economic crisis and social change. Roberts gives no insight regarding how 
a political party can adapt to shifting societal demands. The Bolivian case here 
demonstrated that the traditional political parties were unable to adapt. By examining 
cases of successful party adaptation to societal change, it is possible to envision how this 
adaptation could take place in countries like Bolivia. Part of the answer, as elaborated in 
this study, may be to consider how the extant political system in a country impacts the 
ability of political parties to develop linkages with society. Pacted democracy, for 
example, was positive in terms of enabling governance and stability in Bolivia. It also, 
however, limited the role of the traditional political parties and prevented them from 
establishing stronger linkages with society.
The case of Bolivia underscores the vital importance of deepening our 
understanding of party-society linkages in a country. Political party systems are, after all, 
the fundamental actor in a representative democracy. The fact that they enter into decline 
is undesirable, then, for the regime in general. Moreover, Bolivia is not the only country 
in which party-society linkages may currently be very weak. The multiplication of
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political parties in Ecuador, along with the historically high levels of electoral volatility 
in the country, suggests that the problem of weak party-society linkages extends beyond 
Bolivia into the rest of the Andes. Roberts has already addressed the case of party system 
decay in Venezuela, and the decline of the Peruvian party system prior to Alberto 
Fujimori’s autogolpe in 1993 is another example to investigate. On the other hand, the 
stability o f Colombia’s two-party system is an apparent anomaly given the political 
instability of its neighbors. Indeed, the Andean region may serve as the ideal setting for 
looking comparatively at the formation and erosion of party-society linkages. Future 
research should begin here.
For now, however, we can conclude that the traditional political party system in 
Bolivia is at a crossroads. Far from realignment but still not in complete decay, the 
coming years will be decisive ones for the MNR, MIR, and ADN, as well as the political 
party system in general. Given Bolivia’s tumultuous political history and the recent 
proliferation of powerful political actors, the next years will no doubt be difficult ones as 
well. Perhaps José Ortiz said it best in his citation of an Italian thinker above: Bolivia is 
indeed in a difficult transition.
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APPENDIX 1
Table 3.1
Source: Compiled by author using IMF 2000. 2003 and ECLAC 1999,
Annual economically active population is an estimate based on methods developed by CELADE 
(see http://www.eclac.Org/publicaciones/Poblacion/9/LCG2059/BD64int00i.htm).
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Table 4.1
Vote Share of the Traditional Political Parties versus 
Next Three Top Party Finishers
1989 1993 1997 2002
I ■  Traditional □  Next Three j |
Source: Political Database of the Americas (2000a, 2000b, 2002),
In each year above, Traditional refers to the three traditional political parties, that is, the MNR, 
MIR, and ADN.
In 1989, Next Three refers to Condepa, IU, and PS-1, In 1993, Next Three refers to UCS, 
Condepa, and Movimiento Bolivia Libre (MBL). In 1997, Next Three refers to UCS, Condepa, 
and MBL. In 2002, Next Three refers to the MAS, NFR, and MIP.
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Table 4.4
N = 2904, base = 300
Source: CNE 2004,77; translations by author
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Table 4.5
N = 2904, base = 300
Source: CNE 2004, 79; translations by author
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Table 4.6
N -  2904
Source: CNE 2004, 80; translations by author
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